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3Synthetic biologists seek to design, build and modify 
organisms at the genetic level. One category of 
engineered organisms, or devices, sense changes in 
the environment and respond by producing a change 
in state, such as colour. Two such ‘biosensors’ are in 
development within the Flowers Consortium, and both 
are envisaged to address threats to human health in 
the Global South. Biosensors are at an early stage in 
development, meaning that there is scope to shape their 
future trajectories. 
Accordingly, researchers at King’s College London 
convened a one-day interdisciplinary workshop with 
30 experts working insynthetic biology, regulation, 
global health, international development and the social 
sciences. The workshop’s purpose was to investigate 
the two biosensors and draw lessons for researchers 
and policy makers working in synthetic biology, 
especially when intervening in global health contexts. 
Part one of the report summarises the discussions 
of the day. This executive summary outlines the 
overarching analytic themes from the workshop, which 
can be found in part two.
Understanding global health contexts
Overall, workshop discussions emphasised the 
complexity of the problems that the two technologies 
seek to address. This complexity arises from differing 
geographies, social dynamics, cultures, and histories. 
For instance, what is deemed to be a ‘healthy’ physique 
varies from location to location and is the result of 
cultural, dietary and environmental factors. Likewise, 
different cultures have different understandings of 
sickness and healing, which vary and change over time. 
Such insights mesh-well with an understanding of global 
health as resulting from webs of interaction between 
people, their cultures and the environments that they 
inhabit. Adopting such a position makes visible that 
there is unlikely to be a singular ‘best’ way of framing 
a problem. Rather, the extent to which a problem and 
solution are seen as appropriate will vary depending on 
the perspective taken and by whom.
All of these features are site-specific and have 
a significant impact on the characteristics that a 
technology must have to be successful. Thus, despite 
the importance of the idea of challenge led research to 
address global health, it is fundamental to understand 
to local specificities if a project is to make a worthwhile 
contribution.
Understanding the technologies
Building on our understanding of global health contexts, 
discussion around the two case studies emphasised that 
biosensors are not just neutral tools, but interventions 
into global health networks of organisms, organisations 
and environments. To be effective, a biosensor must 
necessarily be designed to address particular niches 
within this network and embed different design choices 
according to the objectives of its users. These design 
choices are likely to be competing and may be mutually 
exclusive.
Workshop participants also made clear that the 
implementation of each solution would affect different 
people in different ways, empowering some and 
disempowering others, supporting certain ways of 
making sense of the problem and marginalising others. 
And, because projects are increasingly geographically-
Executive summary
4dispersed, with partners in different constituencies, the 
political implications are not limited to the locale of end 
use.
Whilst it may be tempting to view biosensors as primarily 
neutral technical devices, acknowledging the features 
above highlights that the choices embedded into these 
objects are political as much as technical.
Technologies in context
Four recommendations follow from this analysis. 
Researchers and policy makers involved in the 
governance of synthetic biology need to: 
1. recognise the political choices embedded in the 
design and use of biosensors and make key 
decisions explicit in advance of their development;
2. generate knowledge of the complex social and 
cultural contexts alongside the development of such 
projects using established and emerging social 
science methodologies;
3. identify existing interventions that a biosensor seeks 
to improve on, replace or may inadvertently displace 
and analyse the implications of doing so;
4. integrate local knowledge into the design of the 
biosensor by conducting engagement with key 
stakeholders; and acknowledge that integration can 
be laborious.
Three avenues for further research
Part two of the report closes by highlighting three 
tensions that arise as emerging biotechnologies are 
being developed to address global health challenges.
Lock-in
On the one hand, certain aspects of a technology must 
be locked down in order for a project to advance, but 
on the other hand a technology must remain open to 
shaping as contexts change. There are several key 
points at which project ideas can be locked down, 
including initial project framing, circuit design and after 
gaining regulatory approval. Both projects are notable 
in that their initial framing was set in terms of synthetic 
biology seeking applications and problems to address, 
a framing that each team is progressively moving away 
from. Whilst this is a long-identified tension in social 
studies of science, we suggest that it is likely to become 
more important as research funders increasingly 
demand challenge-oriented projects in which those 
who seek funding have, at very early states, to claim a 
fit between their ‘solution’ and the problem it seeks to 
address.
Translational pathways
Relatedly, it is worth attending to the oft-assumed 
models of innovation and translation that shape 
biotechnology projects. At extreme ends, we see 
‘bench to bedside’ and ‘bedside to bench’ models of 
translation. Noting that these are perhaps best seen 
as ideal types rather than representative models, it 
is nevertheless important to explore alternatives and 
attempt to diversify the models of translation and 
innovation apparent and available to researchers 
because: a) the assumed model of translation can 
significantly impact the ability of projects to integrate 
new knowledge into the design of the technology; b) 
5the funding assessment criteria for projects wishing to 
adopt alternatives in global health contexts appears 
to be opaque; and c) such models are coupled to 
institutional reward structures within academia which are 
skewed towards certain outcomes (e.g. funding income, 
intellectual property).
Regulatory frameworks
Finally, we address regulatory tensions in the 
governance of synthetic biology. Discussions 
throughout the workshop highlighted the political, 
social and technical characteristics of biotechnologies. 
Acknowledging that regulation surrounding genetically 
modified organisms is one of the primary points that 
social values around such organisms are codified 
means that it is important to pay attention to any 
challenges to regulatory definitions and frameworks. 
There is currently much discussion regarding the ability 
of novel gene editing techniques, such as CRISPR/
Cas systems, to disrupt established regulatory regimes 
for biotechnologies. However, the workshop identified 
two additional challenges: the legislative distinction 
between ‘deliberate release’ and ‘contained use’; and 
assumptions about the relationship between regulatory 
approval and environmental safety. Whilst noting the 
value of precautionary approaches, we suggest that 
identifying methods to incorporate broader social, 
political and environmental characteristics — beyond 
technical assessments — into the governance of 
synthetic biology technologies may help to address such 
regulatory tensions.
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8Introduction
1 http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/sshm/research/Research-Labs/CSynBI-Events.aspx
2 See here for the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council’s perspective on responsible innovation: https://www.epsrc.
ac.uk/index.cfm/research/framework/. See also: UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap Coordination Group (2012). A synthetic biology roadmap 
for the UK. Swindon, Technology Strategy Board; Stilgoe, J., Owen, R. and Macnaghten, P. (2013). ‘Developing a framework for responsible 
innovation.’ Research Policy 42(9): 1568-1580; Owen, R., Bessant, J. and Heintz, M. (Eds.) (2013). Responsible Innovation: Managing the 
Responsible Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society. Chichester, Wiley.
3 The biosensors in this report can also be described as bioreporters. For consistency, we use the term ‘biosensor’ throughout.
This document reports on a workshop on ‘Synthetic 
Biology Biosensors and Global Health’ organised 
by King’s College London and held at the Royal 
Society of Arts on 13 October 2015. It was the third 
in a series sponsored by the Centre for Synthetic 
Biology and Innovation (CSynBI). The first two were 
on ‘Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity’ and ‘Synthetic 
Biology: Containment and release of engineered micro-
organisms’. Reports and slide presentations for all these 
workshops are accessible here1.
Synthetic biologists are currently developing 
several different biological sensors – that is to say, 
biologically based devices to detect substances in the 
environment – and some of these are intended to be 
used in the Global South to identify threats to human 
health. Bringing the products of synthetic biology into 
these regions, and thereby intervening in complex 
interconnected social, environmental, political and 
technical spaces raises important questions for the 
design and envisaged deployment of these devices. 
The workshop presented here involved participants 
with a range of different sets of expertise: synthetic 
biologists, risk regulators, representatives from civil 
society organisations and social scientists. The aim was 
to bring together different perspectives on these issues 
in order to help build an approach to the development 
of biosensors for Global Health that was compatible with 
the emerging concept of ‘responsible innovation’2.
The underlying principle for this type of biosensor is 
to produce harmless genetically modified bacteria or 
cellular machinery that can detect a harmful agent and 
then emit a signal, for example a change in colour, pH, 
or fluorescence to indicate the presence of that agent3. 
Compared to other kinds of existing detection methods 
(e.g. using chemicals or microscopes) the hope is 
that synthetic biology biosensors might be cheaper, 
easier to use and/or more environmentally friendly. 
Two such projects are currently being developed within 
the UK Flowers Consortium for synthetic biology: an 
arsenic biosensor at the Universities of Cambridge and 
Edinburgh and a biosensor for the parasite that causes 
schistosomiasis, currently being developed at Imperial 
College London (ICL). 
At the time of the workshop each project was at a 
different stage of development. While the Arsenic 
Biosensor Collaboration had produced a physical, 
functioning pilot, the schistosome biosensor team were 
exploring design options, use cases and technical 
feasibility. In line with the principles of responsible 
innovation, such differences presented an opportunity 
for the workshop discussions to inform the future 
development of each biosensor. In addition, the 
workshop focussed on these two case studies in order 
to identify and explore a range of more generic issues 
relevant to synthetic biology biosensors for Global 
Health.
9The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule 
in order to facilitate open and productive discussion. 
This means participants are free to use and disseminate 
the information presented, but neither the identity 
nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any 
other participant, may be revealed. For this particular 
meeting, participants have agreed to be listed (see 
Supplementary material) and the speakers at the 
workshop have given their consent for their names to be 
used in the summary of their talks, and where relevant 
also in the summary of discussion.
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The first part of this report summarises presentations 
made by seven researchers in the field of global 
health and/or synthetic biology and the discussions 
that occurred during the day, replicating as accurately 
as possible what was said by workshop participants, 
without commenting on those statements, and without 
endorsing any of the views expressed. The discussion 
in each case study contains both clarifications relating 
to the presentations and broader discussions relating 
to synthetic biology and/or global health. Arguments 
are reported even when they were only expressed by 
just one or a few participants. The aim is to represent 
the diversity of views expressed and not to seek to 
assign particular weight to any of the arguments 
reported. In the second part of this report the authors 
use their social science expertise to analyse those 
discussions and summarise what they consider to be 
the key findings, and reflect on the dynamics of those 
discussions.
Part 1: Summary of discussions
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Global health and synthetic biology biosensors
The day began with two short presentations, the first on Global Health and the second on Synthetic Biology 
Biosensors. 
4 See: Hahn (1995). “The role of society and culture in sickness and healing.” In Hahn, R. Sickness and Healing: An Anthropological 
Perspective, New Haven: Yale, 1995, p. 76-98.
Global Health
Bronwyn Parry, GHSM, King’s College London. 
Parry’s presentation introduced some of the key 
considerations to be addressed when developing global 
health interventions. It began by recognising that large 
inequalities in health are found throughout the world, 
and that these inequalities are a key motivation for many 
intervention attempts. A crucial point was that culture 
can influence what is even deemed a matter of health 
or disease in a given context, and that this can therefore 
influence what kinds of intervention are likely to succeed 
or fail.
Health inequalities between countries, measured with 
indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy, 
are well known but still shocking. In many cases, 
diseases are concentrated in certain key regions. For 
example, in 2013 over 80% of malaria cases occurred 
in just 18 countries. The success rates of efforts to 
tackle malaria vary widely. Parry noted the Exxon Mobil 
malaria initiative ‘Malaria No More’ as an example of 
the kind of intervention that has proven successful in 
reducing cases of malaria, and which also illustrates 
the wide range of actors involved in global health 
interventions. Aside from traditional state actors, NGOs 
and health delivery agencies, this programme also saw 
philanthropic organisations and commercial companies 
playing significant roles, sometimes in the form of 
public-private partnerships. Parry recommended that 
synthetic biology initiatives in the global health arena be 
prepared to interact with this variety of stakeholders.
Parry also noted that diseases can have very uneven 
political geographies. Through the example of HIV, 
she explained how political issues such as intellectual 
property rights (IPR) can have a dramatic effect on 
access to treatment. For instance, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimated that of the 34 million 
people living with HIV, 26 million need antiretrovirals, but 
by the end of 2012 only around 10 million actually had 
access to them, circumstances thought to have been 
due, at least in part, to overly-restrictive IPR regimes. It 
is therefore important to consider how any technology 
solution developed by synthetic biologists might actually 
be rolled out, bearing in mind the important role of 
national and international political decisions.
Parry then turned to typical portrayals of global health 
issues, using examples of photographs of intervention 
work taken from the internet, arguing that they have a 
particular valence: that of ‘white people going out to 
help people of other colours in developing countries’. 
Parry argued that this is patently not how we should 
conceptualise global health interventions. Global health 
is instead better understood as an iterative process 
involving ongoing conversation between different 
stakeholders. An important way in which this latter 
approach is superior to the former, argued Professor 
Parry, is that it allows us to recognise that how problems 
are understood and prioritised, and thus are seen as 
a matter for intervention, can vary from location to 
location. Anthropologists such as Robert Hahn have 
pointed out that “the culture of a society constructs 
the way members think and feel about sickness 
and healing”4. This highlights that the way in which 
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people understand symptoms, disease progression 
and appropriate treatments is complex, and draws on 
deeply embedded local beliefs and values that can 
differ greatly between one place and another. Rather 
than arriving into the field with presumptions about 
what constitutes priorities for good health, researchers 
seeking to provide solutions need first to consider how 
those apparent solutions are going to be understood 
by their intended users. For example in regions where 
infections by intestinal worms are common, children with 
very bloated bellies are considered ‘normal’. Conversely 
in Samoa, being what we in the UK would call ‘obese’ 
is a physical characteristic to aspire to. These are 
social and cultural constructs rather than simply being 
‘naturally’ determined. In addition, if we look at the 
different explanations given for 
particular health concerns over time, 
we can see that theories as to the 
causes of a disease can change 
dramatically over time The historical 
lesson here for synthetic biology is 
that proposed solutions are bounded 
by the contemporary historical and 
political context. 
Parry argued that many global 
health interventions are intrinsically ‘ethnocentric’, 
meaning that they are characterised by a belief in the 
inherent superiority of the intervener’s own perception 
of the world that prioritises his or her idea of what a 
rational response should be. But, it is very important to 
remain reflexive about what different stakeholders and 
researchers consider to be problems and solutions, and 
to be willing to adapt and change one’s views. Taking 
part in iterative conversations with different stakeholders 
can contribute to this.
Parry referred to the social anthropologist Marilyn 
Strathern, who has stressed that ‘culture’ is something 
5 See, for instance, Strathern, M (1996) Shifting Contexts: Transformations in Anthropological Knowledge. Abingdon: Routledge.
6 Hoogsvelt, A. (2001). Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development, Palgrave Macmillan.
that applies to all societies, including our own, and talks 
about ‘bringing anthropology back home’5. Every society 
is made up of ‘quirky tribes’. We can for example think 
of synthetic biologists and sociologists as ‘quirky tribes’, 
so it is important to reflect and gather insights about 
our own practices. This would help us to move away 
from the unidirectional notion of global health whereby 
‘we’ go ‘over there’ to help ‘them’. Indeed, Parry 
argued, global health is an issue right here in London: 
there is something like a ‘third world’ in every ‘first 
world.’ As argued by Hoogvelt6, in every society in the 
world, you will find the ‘elites’, the ‘contented’ and the 
‘marginalised’. Global inequalities are no longer solely 
geographical divisions; they are embedded in global 
social structures. 
Parry argued that synthetic biology was positioned 
to make enormous potential contributions to vaccine 
development, diagnostics, drug synthesis and so on. 
But in order to make a meaningful contribution in 
global health contexts, lessons need to be learnt from 
successes and failures of the past. This means paying 
serious attention to the various social, geographical, 
political and cultural issues outlined in this talk. Many 
failures in global health have arisen when institutional 
goals and logics did not align with those of the targeted 
population. An example of this is the Global Malaria 
Eradication Programme (GMEP) launched by the WHO 
“The culture of a society constructs 
the way members think and feel 
about sickness and healing.” 
Hahn, 1995
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in the 1950s, which ultimately saw some successes but 
also many failures. In this case, the programme began 
with a large swell of optimism underpinned by large 
amounts of funding. Many experts and policymakers 
believed that worldwide eradication of malaria was 
feasible within a limited timeframe with the use and 
deployment of the right tools: namely the pesticide DDT7 
and the pharmaceutical drug chloroquine. 
The GMEP did indeed result in the eradication of 
malaria in some countries; but this optimism also led 
to disillusionment in other countries where effects were 
not seen as quickly. This in turn led to ‘donor fatigue’ 
and cuts to funding. Another problem was that this vast 
programme was established over and above national 
governments and was therefore detached from national 
health systems, which meant that it could not adapt 
to local conditions. It was based on a one-size-fits-all 
approach that, according to Parry, ultimately proved to 
be inadequate in achieving its stated goal of universal 
malaria eradication.
Parry’s talk ended with three cautionary points to help 
avoid such failures, adapted from a recent paper by 
Liu8. The first was the need to pursue the inclusion of 
multiple publics from the outset. This is likely to produce 
better acceptance of products and processes and 
7 Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
8 Liu, J. A. (2015). Synthetic biology in Global Health: lessons from history and anthropology. Journal of Responsible Innovation 2(1): 96-99.
also, Parry argued, better science. The second was to 
avoid the ‘magic-bullet’ mentality that assumes we can 
helicopter in a technical ‘fix’ and that ignores the fact 
that health problems are the product of entrenched 
social and political inequalities that must themselves be 
tackled at the same time as the technological solutions 
are implemented. Technological fixes that ignore those 
contexts are likely to fail or even to exacerbate matters. 
Taking this into account could help 
to avoid results such as in the WHO 
malaria eradication programme that 
resulted in the rise of artemisinin 
resistance. Thirdly, understanding the 
barriers to successful implementation 
may require ‘turning the telescope 
back on ourselves’ (a reference to 
Marilyn Strathern): what are our own 
values, beliefs, and organisational 
expectations and how are these 
shaping the project in a particular 
way? This means that we need to 
study synthetic biology institutions themselves: what 
are the underlying priorities, assumptions and logics of 
those practicing synthetic biology? If we follow these 
guidelines, we can be hopeful that projects to develop 
biosensors for Global Health will actually deliver 
something meaningful.
“We need to move away from the 
unidirectional notion of Global 
Health whereby ‘we’ go ‘over there’ 
to help ‘them’.” 
Bronwyn Parry
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Synthetic biology biosensors
Paul Freemont, CSynBI, Imperial College London.
Freemont’s presentation began by emphasising that 
synthetic biology envisions merging engineering 
design practice into the systematic construction of 
biological systems and cells at the genetic level. At 
the core of synthetic biology is the aim to construct 
biological systems using the systematic design process 
of engineering. Synthetic Biology’s vision of ‘making 
biology easier to engineer’ rests on the understanding 
that engineers have for some time dealt with and 
attended to systemic complexity, in order to achieve 
robustness and stability in their technological products. 
Freemont explained that, as complex biological systems 
display similar features, synthetic biology aims to 
incorporate engineering principles (such as system 
control, redundancy, modular design and structural 
stability) into research and innovation practices. 
However, certain features of biological systems make 
them less tractable than the systems that engineers 
have typically focussed on: they are much more 
complex, consist of multiple scales (from the atomic 
scale up to human beings and ecosystems) and operate 
over time. In short, they are alive.
Freemont then moved on to biosensors explaining that 
they have been in use for some time – an example 
being blood sugar level monitors. A basic definition is 
that biosensors are analytical devices for the detection 
of substances of interest (analytes). Synthetic biology 
aims to produce biosensors that are quick, simple, 
and cost effective in comparison to existing detection 
methods. They should also allow for high specificity 
with regard to the analytes they detect, thanks to the 
molecular level at which recognition takes place. 
Freemont explained that there are two main types of 
synthetic biology biosensor, which he characterised 
as living and non-living (see figures below and facing). 
Whole-cell biosensors are composed of living cells, 
and make use of the inherent sensing machinery of 
the cell. Novel genetic circuits are incorporated so 
that when triggered by an analyte of interest, they emit 
an output (typical outputs being fluorescence and 
bioluminescence). The primary advantages are that 
bacterial replication makes this cheap, and complex 
systems can be designed. The primary disadvantages 
are that whole-cell biosensors comprise genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), and that there may be 
difficulties in ensuring robustness and reproducibility.
Figure 1: Principle of whole-cell biosensors. Adapted from Goers, L et al (2013) ‘Engineering Microbial Biosensors’. in Harwood, C, Wipat, A. 
(eds) Microbial Synthetic Biology. Academic Press: Burlington.
Plasmid
Plasmid
Plasmid
Genetically encoded sensing modules 
inserted into bacterial cell
Signal / Input (e.g. chemical 
pollutant, pathogen, toxic metal)
Colour Output
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In vitro cell-free biosensors do not carry out their 
sensory operations within a cell, but rather within the 
biochemical cell extract, and can be considered non-
living. Currently used outputs are very similar to those 
employed by living biosensors. Freemont suggested 
advantages including: cell-free systems do not meet the 
regulatory definition of a GMO; they do not replicate; 
and, they are more robust. A major disadvantage is that 
they are currently very expensive. One important article 
published in 2014 demonstrated that cell extracts could 
be freeze-dried and applied to filter paper, which opens 
up room for many new applications9.
Freemont then listed some of the potential applications 
for synthetic biology biosensors, ranging from 
environmental and consumer product monitoring to 
home health tests and the monitoring of industrial 
processes. The design of such sensors requires 
attention to technical details as well as a range of social 
and environmental factors, including the location of the 
target molecule (intra or extracellular), the concentration 
dynamics of the target (will its concentration levels 
be constant or are they likely to change over time?), 
relevance to the process being monitored (does the 
9 Pardee et al. (2014) ‘Paper-based Synthetic Gene Networks’, Cell 159:4, 940-954.
concentration of the detected compound actually reflect 
the process we want to monitor?), specificity (if the 
target compound is similar to other compounds, might 
these also be detected by the biosensor, and will this 
result in ‘false’ readings?), and lastly need (do current 
detection methods exist and what advantages could a 
biosensor have over those existing methods?).
Freemont then went on to describe three classes 
of synthetic biology biosensor: transcription based, 
translation based, and post-translation based. He 
concluded by reiterating that these types of synthetic 
biology biosensors are using natural biological systems 
refactored for detection and that cell-free paper based 
approaches currently showed particular promise.
Figure 2: Cell-free biosensors made from lysed cells have three essential components: A cell-free extract containing machinery for 
transcription and/or translation; A premix containing buffers, energy and resources (cofactors, amino acids); and DNA templates from 
plasmids or PCR products. Adapted from presentation given by Paul Freemont. See also, Lu (2017) Cell-free synthetic biology: Engineering in 
an open world. Synthetic and systems biology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.synbio.2017.02.003 
Cell-free extract
Premix
DNA Template
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Opening discussion
Expense of cell free systems
Following these two introductory talks, group discussion 
first focused on why cell-free systems were so 
expensive. This appears to have been an evolving 
process largely shaped by what these cell extracts 
were being used for: commercial manufacturers, which 
charge a considerable price, have over the years found 
it necessary or advantageous to supplement them with 
components that make them more amenable for use 
as research tools for molecular biology (in, for instance, 
studying fundamental principles of transcription and 
translation). However, simplified extracts are now being 
developed both commercially (with cost-savings of 
~95%) or in-house, where for instance researchers 
at ICL are themselves experimenting with methods to 
produce cheaper extracts.
Comparison with existing medical point-of-care DNA 
diagnostics
One participant mentioned that there are many 
companies worldwide developing cheap, rapid, point-
of-care DNA medical diagnostics and wanted to know 
how synthetic biology sees itself in relation to this 
established industry. A synthetic biologist responded by 
arguing that because synthetic biology is based on the 
engineering of biology, it can produce more complex 
systems than other technologies currently being used 
for diagnostics. For example, it should be technically 
feasible, using synthetic biology ‘logic gates’ to have 
a paper-based biosensor able to detect five different 
analytes simultaneously and produce different coloured 
outputs, depending on which ones are present.
10 http://www.synbicite.com/
11 In February 2016, the UK Synthetic Biology Leadership Council published the “Biodesign for the bioeconomy: UK Synthetic Biology 
Strategic Plan 2016”.
The role of industry in agenda setting
Questions were asked about who dictates the research 
agenda and what the role of the commercial sector 
might be. In response it was explained that Imperial 
College hosts the government-funded national UK 
Innovation Knowledge Centre, SynbiCITE,10 that aims to 
ensure that academic research labs are well-connected 
with firms in order to accelerate the commercialisation 
of synthetic biology. Strategies were also being set by 
research funding bodies and governments. The UK 
government had commissioned a ‘roadmap’ in 2012 
that had constituted an important component of national 
strategy and that was being ‘refreshed’ during 201511. 
The 2012 roadmap had led to the establishment of the 
UK Synthetic Biology Leadership Council that brings 
together synthetic biologists and other stakeholders, 
including industrial partners. It was also acknowledged 
that unless people in different countries actually want 
synthetic biology products, these will not be taken up. 
This means that it is important for researchers to engage 
with other communities. There was a sense that certain 
synthetic biologists had demonstrated a willingness to 
be a part of such a process.
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Case study 1: An arsenic biosensor
This session was devoted to discussion of an arsenic biosensor being developed by members of the Flowers 
Consortium at the Universities of Cambridge and Edinburgh. Talks were given by experts on the problem of 
arsenic contamination, the arsenic biosensor project itself and the regulatory process that this device was going 
through. This was followed by a general group discussion. 
Arsenic contamination: occurrence, causes, 
impacts and mitigation
Peter Ravenscroft, independent consultant
Ravenscroft’s talk provided an overview of the global 
problem of arsenic contamination, its effects on 
health, and impact on agriculture. It also described 
the problems that are likely to be encountered by the 
Arsenic Biosensor Collaboration team (or any arsenic 
sensor project for that matter) when they go out into the 
field.
Ravenscroft explained that the most common way 
in which arsenic gets into groundwater is through 
‘reductive-dissolution.’ Arsenic present in mountains 
that are subject to rapid weathering is released when 
rocks are dislodged and transported into rivers at the 
mountain base. Decomposition of biological matter 
in the rivers creates chemically reducing conditions 
in the water that release the arsenic from the rock. 
Contamination is found on all inhabited continents, but 
the most affected areas occur along the fringes of the 
Himalayas, in North and Central America and parts of 
South America. Arsenic occurs throughout the world, 
including in wealthy countries such as the USA. When 
viewing maps of arsenic contamination, it is important 
to bear in mind that the extent of arsenic contamination 
in surface and ground water is not directly correlated 
with the local scale of human health impacts (see Table 
1). The most affected populations include Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, China and Vietnam. 
Approximately one third of the exposed people in the 
world live in Bangladesh, but importantly, there are many 
countries in the world that have simply not been tested. 
This was why much of Ravenscroft’s talk – and indeed 
much scholarship in the area of arsenic contamination – 
focused on research in Bangladesh.
A key feature of the history of arsenic detection 
throughout the twentieth century has been its discovery 
in certain regions, and then its subsequently being 
largely ignored. Different countries and international 
organisations have set standards for levels of arsenic 
contamination in food and drinking water; these 
decisions have been influenced by the extent to which 
any given country wants to politicise the issue, or 
feels capable of responding to it based on what is 
considered achievable. In many cases, standards for 
acceptable limits have been based on the practical 
level of detection at the time. Arsenic consumption – 
through both drinking water and eating food grown in 
contaminated soil – results in a wide range of serious 
health problems, including cancers, heart problems and 
other conditions leading to premature death. Ravenscroft 
noted that at present the levels of deaths caused by 
arsenic poisoning are not sufficiently recognised, 
because arsenic causes a host of different diseases 
and health problems and those diseases are recorded 
on death certificates without any mention of the role 
of arsenic. One feature of arsenic that Ravenscroft 
emphasised was its latency: effects occur long after 
exposure, sometimes decades later.
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The talk explained that arsenic is not just a problem 
of contaminated drinking water, but also of agriculture 
and food production. When arsenic accumulates in 
the soil, growth of some crops – rice in particular – 
can be heavily impeded by arsenic. Moreover, arsenic 
contamination of the food chain poses serious health 
problems. Mitigating arsenic in the food chain is even 
more complicated than for drinking water. The issue 
of food supply contamination is central, but is even 
more politically sensitive because without a viable 
alternative food supply, the effects of arsenic on rice 
production are often believed to be insurmountable. It 
would for example be untenable to suggest to people in 
Bangladesh that they should not eat rice.
The main mitigation technologies aim to either 
remove arsenic from water or to help people avoid 
contaminated water in the first place. Removing arsenic 
from groundwater can be done through oxidation, 
coagulation-filtration, lime-softening, adsorption, 
membrane technologies, electrolytic methods and 
phytofiltration. Arsenic can be avoided by using 
alternative groundwater sources, through sharing 
of safe wells or by using deep tube wells. In some 
cases however, these deep tube wells have not 
themselves been tested or have not been maintained 
to a sufficiently high standard and so, the problem 
could have worsened. Ravenscroft also noted the 
political dimensions of mitigation which may mean that 
the benefits of mitigation are not necessarily evenly 
distributed. For example, there have been cases where 
newer, safer wells have been located at the end of a 
village where government supporters live. In short, 
testing on its own is of limited use unless there are 
available options for decontaminating or for avoiding the 
contaminated water and using alternative sources.
Ravenscroft nevertheless argued that testing was 
important to raise awareness of the dangers of arsenic 
poisoning. In the 1970s (prior to when the government 
began a large series of tests), the number of shallow 
wells being drilled increased rapidly. By the mid 1990s 
to the mid-2000s however, when the government 
began testing, the number of shallow wells being drilled 
dropped dramatically. After this series of testing was 
completed and the government stopped testing, the rate 
of shallow well drilling again increased steadily (see 
Figure 3, facing page). Testing, Ravenscroft argued, 
is about monitoring and maintaining awareness, and 
ensuring that mitigation efforts are concentrated where 
they are most needed. 
Affordable and easy to use testing is key but 
some existing technologies have been considered 
controversial, as they are not considered sufficiently 
reliable. Current test kits, which use toxic and hazardous 
chemicals, cannot be operated on a commercial model 
for the level of testing that is required due to the very 
low ability to pay and the small number of tests that 
can be completed in a day. In the history of testing in 
Bangladesh, the number of labs working on testing and 
the sensitivity of the testing kits, has increased. However, 
Ravenscroft emphasised that there are currently no 
Country >10ppb >50ppb
Argentina unknown 2.0
Bangladesh 50 27
China 15 5.6
India 30 11
Mexico 0.2 0.4
Nepal 2.5 0.5
Pakistan 5.0 2.0
USA 30 3.0
Table 1: Numbers of people exposed to arsenic contaminated 
drinking water (millions of people; parts per billion). In the US 
and EU, the maximum recommended level is 10ppb; In India, 
Bangladesh and China the standard is 50ppb. Source: Ravenscroft, 
P., H. Brammer & K.S. Richards (2009) Arsenic Pollution: A Global 
Synthesis. Wiley-Blackwell
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testing kits available for use by the general population: 
all testing currently must be performed by government 
representatives or other institutional experts. In short, 
in countries like Bangladesh there is no system of 
accessible and affordable arsenic testing. 
Ravenscroft ended the talk by pointing out that the 
UN had recently established a new Sustainable 
Development Goal to promote access to safe and 
affordable water (SDG 6). Riding on this kind of 
momentum, keeping the problem in the political and 
public eye and making testing available to the general 
public, would be crucial. Ravenscroft’s opinion was that 
the synthetic biology arsenic biosensor (described in the 
following talk) offers the possibility to significantly reduce 
the cost and time devoted to safe testing, and could 
thus help overcome the limitations of existing options.
Table 1
Region: Ashrafupur Union Ashrafpur Chakra Changini Jaqatpur Punshi
1970-79 22 0 13 6 13
1980-89 60 12 36 31 65
1990-99 235 72 110 112 164
2000 120 23 40 38 56
2001 105 11 17 7 31
2002 97 29 37 35 35
2003 35 15 8 12 23
2004 47 24 20 27 28
2005 86 17 28 27 35
2006 108 18 33 28 24
2007 145 43 40 32 36
2008 148 25 35 43 50
2009 120 31 37 38 44
2010 93 29 42 32 53
2011 155 40 43 65 65
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Figure 3: Shallow tube wells in five large villages in the Ashrafpur Union, Bangladesh. The expansion of shallow tube well (STW) installation 
in Bangladesh up to the late 1990s was driven by a motivation to reduce diarrhoeal disease. However, in the 1990s, widespread testing for 
arsenic demonstrated that 98% of STWs were contaminated. These wells were marked (usually with a red cross) and drilling of new STWs 
declined dramatically. Later, when arsenic testing and marking of wells stopped and very little mitigation had taken place, awareness of 
arsenic contamination declined and households began drilling and using more STWs again.  Source: Adapted from Asia Arsenic Network 
(2012). Report on Fact-finding Survey on Water Sources in Ashrafpur Union, Chandpur District: 20 February – 22 March 2012.       Available 
at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B24GorVR0_ZHemxGSDJmTF9JV0k/view
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The Arsenic Biosensor Collaboration
Lalitha Sundaram, CSER, University of Cambridge
Sundaram’s talk explained the work of the Arsenic 
Biosensor Collaboration, a joint-project between 
researchers at the Universities of Cambridge and 
Edinburgh. The Collaboration also involves other 
partners, in particular non-governmental agencies 
in Nepal (ENPHO) and in Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) as 
well as consultants with specialised expertise (David 
Grimshaw, James King, David Nugent and Peter 
Ravenscroft). The project had received funding from the 
Wellcome Trust.
The concept for the project first emerged through 
the work of the 2006 Edinburgh iGEM12 team, which 
won the award for ‘Best Real World Application’ with 
their design of an arsenic biosensor that used a 
change of pH as the output. In 2009, the Cambridge 
iGEM team, with their e.chromi project, found a way 
to make an output that was variable in colour and 
visible to the naked eye (and won the top prize in the 
competition, as well as, jointly, the Human Practices 
prize). The combination of these two projects provided 
the background to the subsequent Arsenic Biosensor 
Collaboration. This project has pursued extensive 
stakeholder engagement from the beginning, with 
collaborative partners in Nepal and Bangladesh and 
with potential end-users. As the product involves the use 
of a genetically modified organism (GMO) the team also 
applied for regulatory approval at an early stage.
Field-testing kits currently in use for arsenic are 
chemical, and their operation requires considerable 
expertise. Their results, argued Sundaram, are difficult to 
read and the chemical processes involved use mercury 
12 The International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition is a competition for undergraduate students that has played a key role 
in the global development of the field of synthetic biology. Based on a kit of biological parts, teams work over the summer to design and 
build biological systems and operate them in living cells. For further information, see: www.igem.org
and can produce arsine gas, both of which can have 
negative health impacts themselves. The key design 
features that the biosensor project therefore aimed 
for were that the biosensor should be cheap, easy-to-
produce, easy-to-use, and be sensitive to bioavailable 
arsenic only (other tests that are not biological may not 
be able to make this distinction). 
Early-stage fieldwork in Nepal provided key pieces of 
information. The team discovered that a graded signal 
output was less desirable to local stakeholders than a 
quasi-digital one. Gradients of pH or colour were seen 
as being too difficult to interpret and so a ‘traffic light’ 
system that would clearly indicate whether particular 
concentration thresholds had been exceeded would 
be preferable. The Nepalese stakeholders had also 
emphasised that they did not wish to have to treat 
the water in any way before testing it (e.g. by boiling). 
The team also learnt that it would be very desirable to 
incorporate a test for coliform into the biosensor so 
that both coliform and arsenic could be tested at the 
same time. Coliform bacteria, Sundaram explained, 
are used as an indicator of water being contaminated 
with sewage and thus being at risk of contamination 
with pathogenic bacteria. Testing for coliform is already 
commonly carried out in the field using a simple-to-use 
H
2
S test, and associating it with the arsenic biosensor 
could help with the uptake of arsenic testing, especially 
if the testing costs could be kept similar to that of 
coliform-only test kits. Nepalese stakeholders had also 
stressed to the team that being able to collect and 
analyse data from individual tests of numerous wells in a 
centralised manner would be of considerable use. 
Sundaram then described how the team has been 
working to incorporate all these findings into the design 
of their biosensor. With respect to the output, the team 
was developing gene circuits that generate coloured 
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spots. There would be a blue positive control (similar 
to the first line in a home pregnancy test) and then, if 
particular thresholds of arsenic had been exceeded, red 
spots would appear (see Figure 4). 
This, Sundaram emphasised, is a whole-cell biosensor. 
The bacterium used as the ‘chassis’13 is the naturally 
occurring non-pathogenic soil bacterium Bacillus subtilis. 
Under certain environmental conditions this bacterium 
can form spores that are highly resilient in a wide range 
of different environments (e.g. surviving freezing and 
boiling temperatures). These spores therefore have a 
long shelf life and can be transported or stored without 
the need for a cold chain or any specialised equipment. 
Bacillus subtilis is not pathogenic and is part of the 
South East Asian diet: it is used in Japan to produce the 
fermented bean product Natto, as well as Kinema, which 
is consumed in Nepal. 
It is also important to consider safety aspects, and the 
fact that the bacteria are genetically modified. Sundaram 
explained that the team has been working to make the 
bacterial strain used in the biosensor attenuated, using 
criteria used for live organisms used as vaccines. The 
aim was to make the bacteria unable to persist in the 
13  The term synthetic biologists use for the organism in which their genetic systems are incorporated.
environment, unable to complete its life cycle and unable 
to revert to wild-type. Overall the intention was to make 
it even more debilitated than it already is and to ensure 
that it remained fixed in that debilitated state. Particular 
attention was paid to how the bacteria were contained. 
Sundaram described that there were two levels of 
physical containment on top of the genetic containment 
described above. The whole device – approximately 
the size of a credit card -  is submerged in the water 
that is to be tested. Upon submersion, the device self-
regulates the water intake and self-seals. Another level 
of containment can be added, through the placing of a 
sticker over the back of the biosensor. Sundaram noted 
that, when the team took a non-GM dummy version of 
the biosensor out to the field in Nepal, they were able to 
explain its use to a young girl, who then carried out the 
process of testing without any problems after only a few 
minutes of informal training. 
In order to facilitate 
large scale testing 
programmes, Sundaram 
then explained that the 
team has developed a 
prototype mobile phone 
app for recording test 
results and linking 
them to a centralised 
database. A QR code 
is incorporated on the 
back of each biosensor, 
which is thus used in 
tandem with the phone 
app. This allows the results to be mapped and centrally 
collected, thus generating useful information about the 
geographical distribution of arsenic contamination (or, if 
tests are performed seasonally, the temporal variation in 
contamination). 
“Decisions about what kind of test data 
should be made public and to whom it 
should be shared is a thorny issue that 
the Arsenic Biosensor Collaboration is 
taking time to think about ” 
Lalitha Sundaram
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The information that this app collects includes a well’s 
GPS location coordinates, the type of water source 
(deep or shallow well, river, household tap etc.), the 
arsenic concentration range, the coliform result, and 
the date and time of testing. Because the data are 
collected via a mobile phone, information about the 
user is also collected (their phone number and location 
when uploading results, for example). While much of 
this information is clearly very valuable as a resource 
for policy makers, there are concerns that some of 
it may be sensitive. In particular, it will not always be 
clear whether someone is happy to have the result of 
tests on their well made publicly-available. This is one 
area where discussions with stakeholders are on-
going, as there could be important social implications; 
There is often stigma associated with arsenicosis, as 
well as with owning/using an arsenic-contaminated 
well. The biosensor cannot solve this problem, but it is 
important that it does not exacerbate it. There can also 
be complex relationships of religion or caste or land/
well-ownership that are tricky to navigate. In the case 
of a communal well, it can be difficult to identify and 
communicate with all the users, unless you paint the 
spout red or green. This was an approach that had 
been taken in the past and was seen by some to be 
problematic, potentially leading to stigma for the affected 
communities.
Beyond such ethical responsibilities, Sundaram 
emphasised, there are also legal responsibilities. As a 
university project involving human subjects (as well-
owners and users), any future trials must be conducted 
under ethical review that ensures the transparency of 
methods, informed consent, lack of harm and clear 
benefit to participants. With respect to data privacy, 
some national regulations emphasise that it is illegal 
to withhold information regarding public health, while 
other regulations emphasise the illegality of making 
private data public. For example, the 2013 Bangladesh 
Water Act states that it is a criminal offense to withhold 
information about water quality. In contrast, the 2007 
Nepalese Right to Information Act has a variety of 
provisions for exemptions regarding the publication 
of private data, in particular pertaining to data about 
public health (which would seem to apply to arsenic 
contamination), or information that “jeopardizes the 
harmonious relationship subsisted among various casts 
or communities”. 
Decisions about what kind of data should be made 
public and who it should be shared with are clearly 
thorny issues that the team is taking time to think about. 
One of the ways in which data will likely end up being 
protected is through stratification of the databases, with 
different levels of granularity available to individuals, 
communities, and local government/institutions. At each 
level, groups could be provided with the information 
necessary for their level of decision-making. For 
example, three or four households could develop a 
well-sharing plan, where one well is used for household 
cleaning and the other for consumption. Community-
level decisions might include installing a water filter 
at a school. District level information could be used 
Concentration of arsenic in water
<10 ppb 10-50 ppb 50-100 ppb >100 ppb
Figure 4: ‘Traffic light’ output for arsenic biosensor
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to determine the best location for deep tube wells or 
allocation of piped water. As Sundaram pointed out, 
it is key to note that the biosensor will need to allow 
for flexibility in order to be adapted to different local 
circumstances.
Trustworthiness of the data is also an issue. For 
example, would governmental authorities be willing to 
trust and use data generated by individuals (a ‘crowd-
sourced’ approach), or would they only trust data 
generated by institutions?
There are further considerations regarding how the 
technology will be used and who will be conducting 
the testing. According to one scenario, staff from an 
institution could travel to a village to test a number of 
wells one day and would report the result the next day, 
perhaps while travelling to another village. This is very 
different to the scenario where an individual visits a 
shop and buys a single kit because they want to test 
their own well. This has implications for the design of 
the biosensor (for example, it is important for the colour 
output to be at its brightest at the time when the tester is 
reporting the results).
Disposal – currently envisaged as being through 
incineration – is a further issue that requires 
consideration, again with regard to different kinds of 
tester. An institutional tester could be required to always 
return to the office with the same number of testing kits 
as they left with, so that disposal could be monitored. 
Individuals, however, would likely be less assiduous in 
the proper disposal of sensors. It is also known that 
in the kinds of areas where the biosensor would be 
Figure 5: Members of the University of Cambridge arsenic biosensor team collected water samples from villages 
in Nepal and Bangladesh. Note the red cross on the well, indicating that it had previously been identified as 
contaminated with arsenic. Credit: Jim Ajioka.
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used, nothing is thrown away - local populations tend to 
repurpose everything. 
In order to overcome some of the issues identified, the 
project is working in close collaboration with actors 
already involved in mitigation and testing. Sundaram 
ended the talk by noting that tapping into this local 
ecosystem is crucial. The regulatory aspects of the 
project – equally crucial – were covered in the following 
talk by Simon Warne.
Risk assessment and regulatory issues
Simon Warne, UK Health and Safety Executive
Warne’s talk concerned the regulatory process for the 
arsenic biosensor. In the European Union (EU) there are 
two key Directives that seek to ensure the safe use of 
genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMs): one for 
‘contained use’ (2009/41/EC) and one for ‘deliberate 
release into the environment’ (2001/18/EC). Contained 
use is defined as “an activity involving genetically 
modified micro-organisms in which specific containment 
measures are used to limit their contact with, and 
provide a high level of safety for, the general population 
and the environment”. It generally applies to the use of 
GMMs in laboratories and factories, and these premises 
need to be registered with regulatory authorities (in the 
UK this is the Health and Safety Executive) before work 
involving GMMs can begin. Deliberate release on the 
other hand is defined as the “intentional introduction 
into the environment of a GMO for which no specific 
containment measures are used” and generally applies 
to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) used 
outside laboratories and factories - crop plants grown 
in agricultural fields, for example. Prior consent must 
be obtained from regulatory authorities before any such 
release, and this involves procedures at the level of the 
European Commission.
Warne noted that it can be difficult to maintain a 
sensible and workable regulatory definition in the face 
of rapid scientific and technical change: he used the 
recent development of genome editing technologies 
as an illustrative example. Under the Contained Use 
Directive, a “genetically modified micro-organism 
(GMM) means a micro-organism in which the genetic 
material has been altered in ways that does not occur 
naturally by mating and/or natural recombination”. This 
definition is then clarified in Directive’s Annexes that 
list techniques that constitute genetic modification (e.g. 
cloning of DNA into plasmids or the direct introduction 
of naked DNA), those not considered to result in genetic 
modification (e.g. in-vitro fertilization, or transduction), 
and yield organisms that are excluded from the Directive 
(e.g. organisms created by classical mutagenesis using 
radiation or chemicals). As new methods have been 
developed, these have had to be accommodated in the 
regulatory system. Moreover, EC Directives are drafted 
following negotiation and the wording is deliberately 
open-ended so that Member States can adapt the way in 
which they convert the Directive into national legislation 
so that it meets national interests. There is therefore 
some flexibility in the wording of legislation within each 
Member State, but if countries diverge too far from 
what the European Commission regards as the spirit of 
the Directive they can take a legal ruling to ‘rein things 
back’.
The European Commission appears to be moving 
towards a more stringent position in interpreting this 
definition, where organisms produced by any process 
leading to a change in genetic material would be 
covered, unless that process were specifically listed in 
the Annex. 
Warne then moved onto possible precedents for whole-
cell biosensors involving GMMs. The first was that of a 
Finnish company that produced a test kit for identifying 
antibiotic residues in milk. Their test was based on a 
GM strain of Streptococcus thermophilus and involved 
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Definition of “contained use”:
In UK Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2014 (Regulation 2(1)):
“Contained use” means an activity in which organisms are genetically modified or in which 
genetically modified organisms are cultured, stored, transported, destroyed, disposed of or used 
in any other way and for which physical, chemical or biological barriers, or any combination of 
such barriers, are used to limit their contact with, and to provide a high level of protection for, 
humans and the environment.
In EU Directive 2009/41/EC on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (Article 2(c)):
“Contained use” means any activity in which micro-organisms are genetically modified or in 
which such GMMs are cultured, stored, transported, destroyed, disposed of or used in any other 
way, and for which specific containment measures are used to limit their contact with, and to 
provide a high level of safety for, the general population and the environment.
Definition of “deliberate release”
In EU Directive 2001/18/EC (Article 2.3):
“Deliberate release” means any intentional introduction into the environment of a GMO 
or a combination of GMOs for which no specific containment measures are used to limit 
their contact with and to provide a high level of safety for the general population and the 
environment”.
In the UK Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002:
There is no definition of “deliberate release” in this Regulation, and since it implements EU 
Directive 2001/18/EC the definition above applies.
Box 1: UK and EU Regulatory definitions of “contained use” and “deliberate release”
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taking ampoules into field sites and opening them in 
order to expose the modified bacteria to the sample of 
milk. Marketing of this biosensor was authorised under 
the Deliberate Release Directive, even though there 
was no suggestion that the GMM would be intentionally 
released into the environment.
The second precedent described by Warne was that of 
a ‘mobile laboratory’ used in Germany. A caravan was 
registered as a Contained Use premises, and within this 
vehicle biosensor test kits could be used14. Warne’s view 
was that this quite flexible interpretation of the Contained 
Use criteria was unlikely to be repeated. In the US there 
is a process for the approval of experimental releases 
of GMMs that do not present an unreasonable risk to 
health of the environment, the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s TERA15 procedure.
Warne then explained how, following discussions 
between staff at the HSE and the arsenic biosensor 
team, it was decided that the most appropriate approach 
would be to apply for authorisation under the Contained 
Use regulations. This was based on the fact there was 
no intention to release the GMO into the environment 
but was also influenced by the assumption that it would 
take a long time to obtain approval under the deliberate 
release regulations.
Thus, the team is attempting to get the GMM in their 
biosensor listed as a GMM that is exempt from the 
Contained Use Directive as per the provisions laid out 
in Article 3 of Directive 2009/41/EC which applies to 
GMMs that have been established as safe for human 
14 This ARSOlux biosensor was described in detail in the report from a previous workshop of the Flowers Consortium. Note that the 
authorization was for experimental field trials conducted in Germany and that the company did not apply for the authorization to 
commercialize the biosensor. See: Marris, C. and Jefferson, C. (2013). Workshop on Synthetic biology: Containment and release of 
engineered micro-organisms: Scoping Report. London, King’s College London, pages 14-17, available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/
departments/sshm/research/Research-Labs/CSynBI@KCL-PDFs/Publications-page/SB-Containment-and-Release-Workshop-Scoping-
Report-Final.pdf.
15  Toxic Substances Control Act Environmental Release Application
16  See Minutes of the 28th meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee on  Genetic Modification (Contained Use) held on Friday 14th 
November 2014, available here: http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/committees/sacgmcu/2014/minutes-141114.pdf
health and the environment. GMMs that meet this 
criteria are to be listed in Annex II, Part C but to date, 
no such organisms have been listed in this Annex. If 
approved, the GM B. subtilis strain used in the arsenic 
biosensor would be the first exempt organism listed. It 
is important to note, though, that exempted organisms 
are still defined as GMMs, and would still be bound by 
Article 4 of the Directive that requires Member States to 
ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid 
adverse effects on human health and the environment 
that might arise from the contained use of GMMs. Annex 
II, Part B of Directive 2009/41/EC sets out the criteria 
for establishing the safety of GMMs for human health 
and the environment that would be exempted (see 
supplementary material for further details). The process 
– as detailed below – has been slow, because the 
application for exemption is breaking new ground and 
setting a precedent for the future.
The talk then described the case that the arsenic 
biosensor team have put together in order to 
demonstrate that the arsenic biosensor GMM is suitable 
for exemption. This includes a set of mutations that seek 
to ensure that it can only survive in controlled laboratory 
conditions along with the two layers of physical 
containment described in the previous talk. The UK’s 
Scientific Advisory Committee on Genetic Modification 
(SACGM) discussed and endorsed the application in 
November 201416, and it was then forwarded to the 
European Commission. At the time of the workshop, it 
was being considered by the European Food Standards 
Agency (EFSA). This was something of a surprise 
because that Agency generally deals with GM crops and 
27
foods, but the Commission decided that this was where 
the most relevant expertise was to be found. EFSA was 
due to give a ruling on the arsenic biosensor case by 
December 2015.
The talk concluded by mentioning that it would not 
have been worth all the effort that has gone into 
this application for exemption if it did not offer the 
opportunity for future projects to be granted approval 
in a more streamlined way. It was also noted that the 
definition of ‘contained use’ in UK regulations and in 
the EC Directive are slightly different and might allow 
for a more liberal interpretation in the UK. The UK 
regulations define contained use as involving GMMs 
“where physical, chemical, or biological barriers, or 
any combination of such barriers, are used to limit their 
contact with, and provide a high level of safety for, the 
general population and the environment”. Under this 
definition, even just one of the containment methods 
(physical or biological) built into the arsenic biosensor 
might be sufficient to gain approval17. 
Discussion in the arsenic biosensor case 
study
Social inequality and arsenic contamination
One participant asked what kinds of persons are 
most affected by arsenic contamination. Ravenscroft 
explained that the poor are most vulnerable, because 
their diet would likely be less varied, and because a 
lack of social influence often translated to not having 
ready access to water from a safe source. Gender was 
also a factor, as men (who typically do more physically-
intensive labour) will drink more water. For women the 
effects are also social by, for example, affecting dowry 
values. In some situations, affected women and children 
17 Note that the UK leaving the EU, which is currently underway, adds uncertainty to any future relationship between European 
Commission and British GMO regulation. 
are socially isolated on a pseudo-voluntary basis, to 
reduce shame in their communities. It is also important 
to bear in mind the massive inter-generational effects 
of arsenic: children’s lives and opportunities will be 
affected by the health status of their parents. Children 
growing up in affected households will grow up less 
educated and earn less. Thus, the poverty cycle will be 
re-iterated.
Given such social inequalities in exposure to arsenic 
contamination, one participant asked whether it might 
be more effective to target the social inequalities rather 
than arsenic contamination; or was it perhaps possible 
to tackle both at the same time? Ravenscroft explained 
how taking social inequalities into account could 
indeed influence decisions about the most effective 
interventions to mitigate exposure to arsenic. For 
example, a single well in Bangladesh may be accessible 
to approximately 100 people in a village with more than 
1000 inhabitants and may be subject to ‘elite capture’: 
meaning that it will be located in a place that is most 
easily accessed by the wealthier elite. In contrast, 
some of the more expensive and slower to implement 
solutions, such as piped water, can capture the whole 
community and therefore enable a fairer distribution of 
benefits.
Political geography of arsenic contamination
Another participant focussed on the question of arsenic 
contamination being marginalised as a political issue, 
and whether or not there is a comparison case of 
a toxic substance that has actually been dealt with 
well, and which arsenic might be able to learn from. 
Ravenscroft used mercury as a comparison, where 
mitigation had been considered economically practical 
and was implemented in the USA. In contrast, arsenic 
contamination in the USA has not been tackled because 
mitigation of health effects is achieved through a highly 
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varied diet, and because the majority of Americans are 
not relying on their tap water every day for hydration.
Questions about the regulatory process for the arsenic 
biosensor
One participant asked why no organism had yet been 
included in the Annex of exemptions of Directive 
2009/41/EC. Was this because no applications for 
exemption had been submitted or because applications 
had been submitted but had failed to obtain approval? 
A respondent explained that there was believed to have 
been a Belgian application that got to a very early stage 
in the process but had ‘run out of energy’. The fact that 
no applications have been pushed through the system 
explains why the procedure is unclear.
Another participant asked about international guidelines, 
and which bodies are currently invested in the 
question of GMO release. One answer was that the 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity regulates the 
movement of GMOs across international borders.
Another participant asked about whether or not EFSA is 
going to respond well to the argument that the arsenic 
biosensor qualifies for Contained Use18 because it is 
kept within a container. Are they likely to accept that it 
does not constitute Deliberate Release? In response 
Warne explained that it remains unclear whether 
one can have Contained Use outside of purpose-
built facilities such as laboratories and factories. A 
number of workshop participants felt that in a technical 
sense the arsenic biosensor fulfils the requirements 
of containment, but in terms of the spirit of the 
Directive this was less clear. A member of the arsenic 
biosensor team pointed out that SACGM had asked 
18 ‘Contained Use’ and ‘Deliberate Release’ are used here with capital letters to indicate that we are talking about the legal definitions for these 
concepts as set out in EC Directive 2009/41/EC.
19 See: Marris, C. and Jefferson, C. (2013). Workshop on Synthetic biology: Containment and release of engineered micro-organisms: 
Scoping Report. London, King’s College London, pages 14-17, available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/sshm/research/
Research-Labs/CSynBI@KCL-PDFs/Publications-page/SB-Containment-and-Release-Workshop-Scoping-Report-Final.pdf
for further details regarding the nature of the container, 
which suggests that physical containment was being 
considered as a significant factor in the decision. 
It was suggested that one reason why the case of 
the arsenic biosensor has proven so difficult for 
regulators is that the directives in question have been 
most closely associated with GM crops. For crops 
the difference between Contained Use and Deliberate 
Release into the environment is very much clearer, but 
because many synthetic biology applications envision 
the use of genetically modified micro-organisms we 
are now witnessing a blurring of these divisions. This 
had been a key topic at a previous workshop of the 
Flowers Consortium19. In addition, novel approaches 
such as paper-based biosensors are challenging 
previous understandings of ‘deliberate release into the 
environment.’ It was however pointed out that modifying 
an EU Directive or issuing new legislation would be 
a very slow process; and that in the current political 
context it could lead to even more stringent regulations.
There was a discussion about what would happen 
to the project if the European Commission ultimately 
did not approve the application. This was thought to 
be a possible outcome because some specific EU 
Member States are known to be very reticent about 
GMOs. The arsenic biosensor team’s conversations 
with the authorities in Bangladesh and Nepal have 
centred around the need for approval to be given in 
either Europe or the USA, as Nepal did not at the 
time have regulations covering GMOs. The team has 
therefore considered applying for approval by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to conduct a 
field trial (not for manufacture or marketing), in addition 
to their EU application under the Contained Use 
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Directive. If this is granted there is still a chance that the 
project can go forwards. Another possibility would be 
to apply for an EU authorisation for commercialisation 
under the Deliberate Release Directive, even though 
the team and the UK regulatory agencies believe this is 
not necessarily the most appropriate route. This route 
would apparently take a year or so and would involve 
decisions processes at the EU level but at least there 
is a known regulatory procedure that has already been 
implemented.
As far as anybody present knew, the regulatory 
procedure under the Deliberate Release Directive had 
however never been used to authorise the commercial 
release of genetically modified bacteria: it has only 
been used so far for the commercialisation of GM 
plants. Experimental field releases of GMMs had been 
authorised in specific EU Member States, including trials 
of the ARSOlux biosensor conducted in Germany. It was 
however pointed out that medicinal products made from 
or consisting of GMOs go through a different regulatory 
route in the EU; and that some GMMs used in medicines 
(e.g. GM viruses and bacteria used in vaccines) had 
been evaluated and approved for both clinical trials and 
marketing in the EU.
Coliform test more of a biological hazard that the 
arsenic biosensor
During the discussion it became apparent that the 
disposal of the bacteria collected from the environment 
and being detected by the coliform test component of 
the biosensor was potentially a more important safety 
issue than disposal of the arsenic biosensor bacteria. 
The bacteria used in the arsenic biosensor are not 
pathogenic and have been engineered to drastically 
reduce their chances of persisting in the environment. 
This is the basis for the application to make it exempt 
from the Contained Use Directive. In contrast, the 
coliform test involves amplifying potentially pathogenic 
bacteria in quantities that might present a risk to human 
health. While these coliform tests are not new, they are 
currently used only by trained members of 
NGO or governmental testing teams. There are 
precedents for local communities to conduct 
these tests, but nevertheless the instructions 
for disposal will require consideration.
The local context of waste disposal
Some participants pointed out that in 
developing countries all rubbish is typically 
thrown in ordinary rubbish dumps with little particular 
consideration for the health hazards posed by particular 
kinds of refuse (e.g. used medical equipment such as 
syringes used for HIV tests). We should therefore not 
expect waste disposal instructions designed for the UK 
context to be followed and it was important to take into 
account, when considering the safety of the device, 
the way in which the biosensor would be disposed of 
in such locales. There is also an issue of scale: if the 
arsenic biosensor is successful, millions of test kits are 
likely to be used and it then becomes very likely that at 
least some of them will not be disposed of properly: this 
would also be true in a wealthy country in the Global 
North. The Arsenic Collaboration Team responded 
that it has indeed considered this, by engineering the 
bacterium to minimise the possibility of it persisting 
in the environment following any potential release, 
and conducting laboratory experiments to test, for 
example, how long they can survive in soil and how the 
engineered bacteria compete with wild bacteria.
“Used biosensor kits will be 
thrown on the rubbish dump 
where children play.”
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International safety regulations: who wields the power?
Some participants brought up the topic of international 
collaborations on safety regulations in order to stress 
the importance of international bodies as a way of 
counterbalancing powerful states such as the US. 
Others brought it up in order to stress how the lack of 
regulation for GMOs in developing countries, combined 
with the lack of scientific capacity in biotechnology 
in those countries, presents a serious challenge for 
the introduction of synthetic biology products in those 
countries.
It was also pointed out that international harmonization 
of safety regulations for synthetic biology is an issue 
currently being discussed by parties of the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, that already 
regulates the ‘transboundary movement’ of ‘living 
modified organisms’. One workshop participant who 
had been present at a recent meeting of the Subsidiary 
Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological 
Advice (SBSTTA) reported that it seemed as though 
issues raised by NGOs during the open debates (e.g. 
indigenous rights, farmers losing their livelihoods, the 
cultural context of technology, the role of industry, 
exploitation) were not raised by representatives from 
developing country governments who were also present. 
Instead, it seemed that these representatives were quiet 
during the debates, but in private conversations they 
expressed a lot of interest in getting access to synthetic 
biology technologies.
Overall, a key point to emerge from this discussion 
was that decisions about who gets to sit at the table 
at international negotiation forums will to a large extent 
determine how the agenda is set, which issues get 
raised, and whose interests are prioritised.
What are users expected to do with a positive test 
result?
Some participants wanted to emphasise that while 
better testing technology is clearly important, the 
real challenge was what to do with the results of the 
test. The arsenic biosensor team was congratulated 
for having developed technology that works well to 
identify contaminated water, but were asked how 
they envisioned the testing kits having an influence 
on access to clean water and what they saw as the 
potential for infrastructural improvement in water supply. 
Using the example of HIV testing in the past, one 
participant asked about the value of urging local 
populations to test for arsenic in their drinking water 
if they do not have access to an affordable method to 
treat the water. In response Sundaram stressed that it 
was important that awareness, testing and mitigation 
measures went hand in hand. At the local level, there 
are things that individuals can do. Learning which wells 
are unsafe can help people decide which water source 
to use for drinking, and which for washing. Another use 
can be in helping to decide whether or not to pay for 
piped-in water. Also, arsenic contamination is seasonal, 
so at different times of the year arsenic contamination 
in water from a particular well will vary, and access to a 
cheap and easy to use testing kit could allow villagers to 
test the same well over time. The issue of mitigation was 
one reason why it was important for the team to work 
with a Nepalese partner such as ENPHO that is already 
involved in mitigation and awareness-raising. 
Stakeholder engagement: when, who and how? Who 
are the legitimate stakeholders?
On several occasions during the morning, the 
discussion returned to the relative legitimacy of NGOs, 
governments and local users with respect to their 
influence on the design of a biosensor project, on safety 
regulations, and more generally on public debates. 
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Some participants felt that the public debate around 
synthetic biology was overly dominated by NGOs, and 
that they unfortunately ‘held the moral ground’ but 
that they did not necessarily represent the views of 
governments and other stakeholders or of the general 
population. Other participants were of the view that 
NGOs play a crucial role to counterbalance the powerful 
interests of governments and private corporations, 
which are not necessarily well aligned with the welfare 
of the general population. One member of the arsenic 
biosensor team suggested that engaging with the actual 
people who are affected on the ground in order to get 
them on board was perhaps the best way forward, rather 
than focusing on official organisations. 
A number of participants wanted to learn more about 
when and how the arsenic biosensor team had engaged 
with stakeholders, and who these were. Team-members 
explained that in the case of Nepal the first point of 
contact was an NGO, the Environment and Public 
Health Organisation (ENPHO). ENPHO is part of the 
National Arsenic Steering Committee, responsible for 
testing programs in the past, which had been conducted 
with partners such as UNICEF and the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency. At the local level, the 
team had also spoken to governmental departments 
involved in water supply and sanitation, as well as village 
Water User Service Committees, that are locally-elected 
in each village. During these visits the team were also 
able to speak to people from the villages. Thus the team 
had spoken with the kinds of people doing the testing 
and those having their wells tested.
A member of the arsenic biosensor team expressed 
the belief that the design of synthetic biology products 
can – and should – include stakeholder engagement 
right from the start. They cited the importance of the 
change in output signal (from a gradated colour change 
to a traffic-light system) as one that had required a great 
deal more work to implement (involving the engineering 
of separate bacterial strains for each of the different 
threshold levels of contamination as opposed to a 
single strain) but which is essential to create a workable 
technology appropriate to its purpose.
Who controls the data? Not just a privacy issue
The arsenic biosensor incorporates 
a data collection system. Participants 
wanted to know more about how 
this data is going to be shared. One 
participant stressed that the issue 
was not only about the potential 
disclosure of private information 
such as the user’s phone number or 
home address, because there are 
also broader political considerations. 
Governments will need access to the testing data in 
order to inform their decision-making. At the same time, 
some of the data might be of interest to the commercial 
sector. This raises ethical questions about who controls 
the data. If data is not freely shared, then power lies in 
the hands of those who can access it.
Another participant suggested that a restrictive focus 
on data privacy was driven by a Euro-centric legalistic 
position. Instead, wider sharing of data could be seen 
more positively as a duty of care. For example, if you 
report results only to the male head of a household, 
you may be neglecting your duty of care towards his 
children. In this regard a powerful precedent for the 
sharing of information had been set in Bangladesh 
by the government during its early 2000s testing, 
when wells were painted red or green to publicly 
“If data is not freely shared, then 
power lies in the hands of those 
who can access it.”
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indicate whether the water was below or above safety 
standards for arsenic. In addition, it may not be up to the 
arsenic biosensor team, or anyone participating in this 
workshop, to decide what level of information should be 
made public. What the team can do is design a system 
that has the capability to depersonalize the information 
and then let local authorities decide what should be 
done. 
A member of the arsenic biosensor team emphasised 
that data uploading and sharing could be part of a 
process of communication and engagement with the 
users. It could, for instance, be a way to see where tests 
are being conducted, how many are being conducted, 
and whether or not the biosensor is being used 
correctly. 
One participant pointed out that from a historical 
perspective, public health initiatives have frequently 
trodden on difficult ground with respect to boundaries 
between public and private spheres. For example, when 
the UK government decided to introduce piped water 
into people’s homes in the nineteenth century, there 
was a lot of concern that this would be an invasion into 
privacy (as the saying goes, ‘an Englishman’s home 
is his castle’). These difficult issues are exacerbated 
when there is a mixed economy of water provision, with 
provision coming from both the private and the public 
sectors, but they have been successfully tackled in the 
past.
GM and its publics
A number of participants felt that the arsenic biosensor 
project was likely to be received negatively in light of 
the history of public controversies around genetically 
manipulated (GM) crops and foods. When this issue 
was raised, a number of discussion points followed.
Some participants felt that communication surrounding 
GM crops and food to the public had not been handled 
well and had led to unwarranted public fears, especially 
about potential negative impacts from eating GM food. 
The danger, in their view, is that such public fears will 
carry over to synthetic biology biosensors and lead to 
‘knee-jerk’ negative reactions. It was therefore important 
to get the communication aspect right this time, in order 
to get people on-board and to ensure that members of 
the public do not put synthetic biology biosensors in 
the same ‘bucket of feelings’ as GM food. In their view 
the scale of the public reaction against GMOs remains 
considerable, and despite the extent of the containment 
features that have been incorporated into the arsenic 
biosensors, existing prevalent negative public attitudes 
towards GMOs is likely to be the largest impediment 
to the success of the arsenic biosensor. There was a 
belief among many participants that it will be difficult to 
communicate that this technology is very different to the 
cases that have, often rightly, been highly controversial. 
Other participants stressed that communicating in a 
transparent manner about these kinds of technological 
innovations, including about their potential risks, was 
important in order to enable members of the public 
to make informed decisions; and that this was very 
different from communicating simply in order to 
convince them to accept your device.
Many participants felt that there were legitimate 
concerns about the safety of GM foods; and some felt 
that the role of large multinational corporations such as 
Monsanto had played a negative role in the development 
of GMOs and in the communication strategies deployed. 
A number of participants felt that only some public 
concerns about GM foods had been legitimate, but that 
those concerns did not apply to the arsenic biosensor 
case. For example, there were legitimate questions 
about whether GM products such as GM tomatoes 
or salmon were needed.  It was pointed out that on 
all these dimensions, the arsenic biosensor could be 
assessed more positively than GM crops and foods.
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While all participants who expressed themselves agreed 
that the arsenic biosensor seemed to be extremely safe, 
for some participants, issues such as disposal (see 
above) were still significant and real safety issues, not 
just public communication issues.
Championing a way of doing science alongside the 
product of science
One participant argued that understanding the GM 
controversy as a ‘mess’ that is rooted in irrational 
public fears fails to recognise that it can be entirely 
reasonable for members of the public to examine the 
kind of world that is produced by particular scientific 
practices. For example, discussions at this workshop 
had demonstrated that a win for the arsenic biosensor 
was not just seen as a win for that particular project, 
but more generally as a win for synthetic biology, and 
beyond that, a win for the kind of institutional and 
funding arrangements that supported its development. 
It would therefore be entirely legitimate for people to 
scrutinise every facet of this technology, ‘all the way 
down to its core’. This participant then went on to 
explain that, in the case of the arsenic biosensor, the 
surrounding social and political contexts could actually 
be used to the advantage of the project. By emphasising 
how this biosensor is not like previous GMOs with 
regard to interventions in national labour markets, 
food supply, ownership by large industrial partners, 
biodiversity protection and so on, the team could 
be even clearer about what this 
technology could mean for people 
in a way that would be entirely to the 
Arsenic Biosensor Collaboration’s 
advantage.
Another participant argued that the 
public controversy about GMOs has 
not been only or mostly about safety. 
Key questions raised in the GMO 
debate were also: Who is doing it? 
Why are they doing it? What kind of 
needs are being addressed? Who 
sets the agenda? For GM crops and 
foods, this participant argued, the 
answers to these questions have 
commonly been that the GMOs 
have been produced by a few large firms and aimed at 
a narrow range of crop traits and this – the participant 
continued – was at the heart of the controversy, just 
as much as safety. As such, the arsenic biosensor 
project can be championed not only because it is safe, 
but also because it can distinguish itself along these 
other dimensions. In this context, any research team 
developing biosensors for global health needs to be 
transparent about the nature of any links their project 
has with industry.
“A win for the arsenic biosensor 
wouldn’t just be a win for the 
arsenic biosensor: It would be a 
win for synthetic biology and the 
kind of institutional and funding 
arrangements that led to its 
creation.”
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Case study 2: A schistosome biosensor
This session was devoted to discussion of a schistosome biosensor that was at an early stage of development 
by members of the Flowers Consortium at Imperial College London. Talks were given by experts on the problem 
of schistosome occurrencee and the biosensor project. A general group discussion followed.
Schistosomiasis: occurrence, causes, 
impacts and mitigation
Joanne Webster, Centre for Emerging, Endemic and 
Exotic Diseases, Royal Veterinary College
Webster’s talk gave background information as to 
the epidemiology of and current challenges faced 
by researching the neglected tropical disease 
schistosomiasis (bilharzia). Currently, about 240 million 
are infected worldwide and infection can lead to a 
number of different health effects including serious 
damage to the bladder. In some regions of Africa this is 
very common and most children are affected. 
Schistosomiasis is a blood-borne fluke (flatworm) that 
is transmitted through fresh water between definitive 
hosts (where it reaches maturity and reproduces) and 
an intermediate snail host (see Figure 6). Depending 
on the species of schistosome, the definitive host can 
be humans, other mammals such as cattle, or birds. 
This means that it is a disease of both humans and 
animals and has an impact on agriculture as well as 
on human health. Different species that infect either 
humans, cattle or birds are present in different parts of 
the world. Webster noted that this means that it would 
be very useful to have a device that could identify not 
just the presence of schistosomes in water, but be able 
to distinguish between species. 
The environment for schistosomiasis, Webster explained, 
is changing, due to a number of different factors, 
including a vaccination program for water buffalo in SE 
Asia, global warming, the construction of new dams 
(which provide bodies of fresh water for the snails) 
and changing agricultural practices (where for instance 
herders follow their animals all day - including into the 
water - rather than letting them roam alone). Despite 
the worms’ long life span (seven years on average), we 
can, argued Webster, expect schistosomiasis to adapt to 
these changing environments.
There is an effective drug treatment for schistosomiasis 
- praziquantel (PZQ) - but large-scale use of this 
drug is generating pressure on the fluke to develop 
resistance. The Schistosomiasis Control Initiative was 
set up at Imperial College London 12 years ago, and 
between 2003 and 2015 the SCI administered over 
100 million PZQ treatments in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The success of these programmes influenced the 
WHO strategic plan on schistosomiasis: while it had 
previously focused on controlling morbidity rather 
than on reducing the incidence of infections, it now 
had adopted the more ambitious goal of eliminating 
schistosomiasis as a public health problem by 2025. 
Pharmaceutical companies have been closely involved 
in these programmes and Webster cited Merck’s pledge 
to donate 250 million tablets of PZQ a year by 2016 as 
an example.
Webster then cautioned that it may not be realistic 
to talk about eliminating the disease altogether. In 
China, for instance, where the particularly serious 
species S. japonicum resides, there has been a very 
intensive programme spanning more than 50 years 
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that has included drug treatment, health education, 
molluscicides, modification of the environment, and 
behavioural change, but schistosomiasis has remained 
endemic in some regions and is re-merging in others. 
Webster used this example to illustrate the dynamic 
and complex nature of the situation: one reason for the 
inability of the programme in China to fully eradicate 
schistosomiasis appears to be that while it had been 
assumed that water buffalo were the primary animal 
reservoir, wildlife also play a significant role, with wild 
rodents acting as ‘super-spreaders.’ That is, depending 
on the conditions, the parasite can switch host. 
Moreover, worms that infect these rodents are shed from 
snails at dusk, which is when the rodents are present, 
20 For further details see: Lu, D., Wang, T-P., Rudge, J., Donnelly, C.A.,  Gua, C. & Webster, J.P. (2009) Evolution in a multi-host parasite: 
Chronobiological circadian rhythm and population genetics of Schistosoma japonicum cercariae indicates contrasting definitive host 
reservoirs by habitat. International Journal for Parasitology 39: 1581-1588; and Rudge, J.W., Lu, D-B, Feng, G-W, Wang, T-P, & Webster, J.P. 
(2008). Population Genetics of Schistosoma japonicum within the Philippines Suggest High Levels of Transmission between Humans and 
Dogs. PLoS Neglected Tropic Diseases. 2 (11), e340
whereas the worms that infest water buffalos are shed 
from the snails in the morning, which is the prime time 
for the cattle to come into the water20. 
In Africa, Webster explained, mitigation efforts have 
focused on S. haematobium because this species’ host 
range is thought to be restricted to humans (and some 
primates). Therefore, controlling the worm in humans 
through mass drug administration was expected to 
lead to elimination of the disease. Taking Niger as an 
example, this strategy has worked in some regions 
and the prevalence has been drastically reduced. 
However, in other regions, prevalence has remained 
very high despite a very thorough drug administration 
Figure 6. Life cycle of the Schistosome species showing the different life stages and hosts. Credit: Genome Research Limited (CC BY 3.0)
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programme. There were concerns that this might be due 
to the development of drug resistance by the parasite, 
but this is not the case. Treatment of infected children 
with PZQ is still effective but there is very rapid bounce 
back about six weeks after treatment. This was puzzling 
because S. haematobium takes eight weeks to mature 
and start laying eggs. It turned out that, contrary to 
textbook knowledge about schistosomes that states that 
they pair up with a mate from the same species and 
remain paired for the rest of their lives, schistosomes 
are in fact quite promiscuous and can also form pairs 
between different species and, in some cases, these 
hybrids produce viable offspring. In Niger, research 
revealed that S. haematobium was mating with other 
(zoonotic) schistosome species that take 6 weeks to 
mature21. 
Webster then described ongoing research in West 
Africa which now focuses on situations where human 
behaviour – including mitigation measures – could be 
leading to changing behaviours in the parasite (such 
as hybridisation). Potential consequences now being 
investigated include new sites of infection, broader 
host ranges, switches in host, increased transmission 
potential, higher virulence, and altered drug resistance. 
These, Webster emphasised, will need to be taken into 
account in monitoring and control programmes, and 
the complexities involved suggest that it may not be 
realistic to envision entirely eliminating schistosomiasis 
from Africa. Moving away from Africa, Webster noted 
that there had also been reported instances of 
schistosomiasis in Europe – in  Corsica, Spain and 
Portugal, for instance, where the cause appeared 
21 For further details see: Huyse T, et al. (2013) Hybridisation between the two major African schistosome species of humans. International 
Journal of Parasitology 43: 687-689; Koukounari A, et al. (2010) The impact of single versus mixed schistosome species infections on liver, 
spleen and bladder morbidity within Malian children pre- and post-praziquantel treatment. BMC Infectious Diseases 10:227; Webster BL, 
et al. (2013) Introgressive Hybridization of Schistosoma haematobium Group Species in Senegal: Species Barrier Break Down between 
Ruminant and Human Schistosomes PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases 7(4): e2110; Leger E & Webster JP (2017) Hybridisations within the 
Genus Schistosoma: implications for evolution, epidemiology and control. Parasitology 144: 65-80; King KC, et al. (2015) Hybridization in 
Parasites: Consequences for Adaptive Evolution, Pathogenesis, and Public Health in a Changing World. PLoS Pathology 11(9): e1005098.
22 For further details see: Moné H, et al. (2015) Schistosomiasis Haematobium, Corsica, France. Emerging Infectious Diseases 20(9): 1595-
1597; Boissier J, et al. (2014)  Schistosomiasis reaches Europe Lancet Infectious Diseases. 15(7): 757-758
to result from hybridisation of human and animal 
schistosomes22.
These findings also mean that it would be particularly 
useful to have a schistosomiasis biosensor that was 
able to distinguish between species, and to identify 
hybrids. Another lesson is that dealing with both human 
and animal health together may be the most effective 
approach to deal with this infectious disease that is both 
very ancient (it is present in Egyptian mummies) and 
‘emerging’.
Schistosome biosensor project
Alex Webb, CSynBI, Imperial College London
Webb explained the origins, aims and ambitions of 
the schistosome biosensor project at Imperial College 
London (ICL). The idea emerged in 2010 from the ICL 
iGEM team that aimed to develop a platform to detect 
a range of different parasites, not just schistosomes. 
Parasites and their eggs release specific proteases at 
different stages of their life cycle and so this seemed 
to be a good target for a biosensor. The ICL team 
is working on the development of both a whole-cell 
biosensor and a cell-free biosensor.
The project follows the iterative design-build-test scheme 
emphasised in synthetic biology. The team started 
by researching the proteases released by different 
parasites in order to identify a specific target for the 
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biosensor. They found potential motifs that were specific 
to the parasites Trypanosoma cruzi (Chagas disease), 
Plasmodium falciparum (malaria) and Schistosoma 
(schistosomiasis). Schistosomiasis was chosen because 
it is a neglected tropical disease that affects more than 
200 million people worldwide each year, with important 
consequences (as described in the previous talk by 
Joanne Webster).
When the cercariae make contact with the skin of their 
host they release a cocktail of enzymes. One of these 
is called cercarial elastase. It breaks down the skin 
and enables the parasite to infect the host. The ICL 
biosensor is designed to detect this enzyme.
The design of the biosensor was first envisaged 
within a bacterial cell: E. coli thanks to its tractability 
in the lab. It was built such that the engineered (and 
introduced) detection and signal genetic modules would 
be expressed on the surface of the bacterial cell. The 
biosensor relies on three components: a synthetic 
peptide attached to the outside of a bacterial cell wall, 
fluorescent markers, and elastase produced by S. 
mansoni (Figure 7). The synthetic peptide is a tagging 
molecule to which fluorescent markers can bind, and 
contains a site (motif) that has previously been identified 
as cleavable by S. mansoni elastase. This modular 
design means that it could be easily adapted to detect 
a different parasite by changing the motif that allows the 
peptide to be cleaved. 
A two-stage process is envisaged where the biosensor 
is first immersed in a water sample and then a 
fluorescent marker is added to the solution. In stage 
one, if S. mansoni elastase is present, the tagging 
molecule will be cleaved from the biosensor. If S. 
mansoni elastase is absent, the tagging molecule will 
remain. In stage two, if S.mansoni elastase has cleaved 
the tagging molecule, there will be nothing for the 
23 For a discussion on this topic, see Webb AJ, Kelwick R and Freemont P (2017). Opportunities for applying whole-cell bioreporters towards 
parasite detection. Microbial Biotechnology. 10(2): 244-249
fluorescent marker to bind to and the bacterial will stay 
colourless. If the molecule remains, then the bacteria will 
turn red. Thus, the presence of S. mansoni is indicated 
by a lack of colour and the absence of S. mansoni is 
indicated by a red colour. 
For experimental purposes, the team has built multiple 
different biosensors: one contains the motif specific for 
cercarial elastase, another, used as a positive control, 
has a motif specific to the commercially available 
TEV protease and the third contains a motif with no 
specificity and is used as a negative control. The 
first chassis used was E. coli, because it is easier to 
manipulate in the laboratory. These three biosensors 
were exposed to three different commercially available 
proteases: TEV protease, Enterokinase, and PreScission 
protease. The results showed that the TEV biosensor 
was specific to its intended target and was able to 
detect very low amounts of enzyme. There were no off 
target effects: the TEV biosensor was only cleaved by 
the TEV protease; and the other two biosensors were 
not cleaved by any of the three proteases.
The team also incorporated their biosensor design 
into Bacillus subtilis, because products made in this 
bacterium have been granted ‘generally recognised as 
safe’ status for use in food by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (see also previous talks by Simon Warne 
and Lalitha Sundaram). It was hoped that using bacteria 
with GRAS status would help to address concerns 
from regulatory agencies when taking this into the field, 
although it is unclear whether such a status would apply 
to a non-food application23. B. subtilis is a gram positive 
bacterium whereas E. coli is gram negative. This means 
that the cell walls are different and the biosensor design 
had to be adapted. 
The initial strain of B. subtilis used turned out to have 
too many native proteases, which meant that the 
38
Figure 7. Design of the schistosome biosensor, showing the protein, embedding in the membrane wall with protease recognition motif and 
tag. Cleavage, by a schistosome elastase, of the tag at the protein recognition motif ultimately leads to loss of colour. Credit, Webb A, Kelwick 
R, Doenhoof MJ, Kylilis N, MacDonald JT, Wen KY, McKeown C, Baldwin G, Ellis T, Jensen K and Freemont P (2016) A protease-based 
biosensor for the detection of schistosome cercariae. Scientific Reports, 6: 24725 (CC BY 4.0)
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bacteria themselves were able to cleave the biosensor 
motif. Another strain (WB800N) was therefore used, 
that has had eight genes for proteases knocked out by 
mutation. After several design iterations, experiments 
with the TEV biosensor in B. subtilis showed that was 
specific to TEV and fairly sensitive, though not as 
sensitive as the biosensor in E. coli.
The next stage in the research was to see whether or 
not they could detect the actual elastase implicated 
in schistosomiasis. Biological samples were obtained 
by mechanically breaking up cercariae from infected 
snails and lyophilising the supernatant. These were 
supplied by Prof. Mike Doenhoff from the University 
of Nottingham (also present at the workshop). When 
the three E. coli biosensors were exposed to these 
biological samples, all three were cleaved although 
the elastase biosensor was more sensitive. In other 
words, there were significant off-target effects. This 
may be the consequence of the method of preparation 
of the biological samples because when the cercarial 
worms are crushed in order to produce the sample, 
multiple proteases are released. A different method 
of sample preparation is therefore being investigated 
with Doenhoff. However, this hypothesis is challenged 
by the fact that tests using biological samples with the 
biosensor in the B. subtilis chassis did not show off-
target effects24. An experiment showed very promising 
results with one biological sample (only the elastase 
biosensor was cleaved) but no effect at all with two 
other biological samples. This is because one sample 
contained more elastase than the others25.
These results were considered to be encouraging 
enough to investigate another issue: would the 
whole-cell B. subtilis biosensor still work after being 
freeze-died and then revived? This is important if 
the biosensors are going to be shipped across long 
24 Subsequent research from the Schistosome biosensor team has explored these questions in more detail, with differences in cell architecture 
appearing to play a role. Webb AJ, et al. (2016) Scientific Reports
25 Ibid.
distances. Experiments were performed and the results 
showed that the cells did survive and maintained their 
plasmids after such treatment.
Turning to issues of usability and future developments, 
Webb noted that the biosensor would likely be easier 
to use by people in the field if the output was a gain 
in colour, rather than a loss of colour. The team is 
investigating new designs to deal with this. This 
may also mean that fluorescent tagging would be 
unnecessary, possibly making the biosensor more 
sensitive and cheaper to produce and use.
Finally, the ICL team has decided to investigate the 
possibility of using a cell free system. As explained in 
the earlier talk by Paul Freemont, a cell-free system 
is made by breaking open bacterial cells. The cells 
are killed but all the bacterial machinery required to 
express genes, make proteins and fold them is present 
and active. The plasmid containing the genes for the 
biosensor can then be added, together with chemicals 
that provide energy. The team believed this approach 
may address concerns (embodied in the regulatory 
landscape) about using genetically modified bacteria 
in the environment, but there may also be technical 
benefits to such a system: preliminary experiments have 
been conducted to validate the principle for such a cell-
free system and the results are promising.
Webb concluded his talk by noting that Webster’s talk 
had spoken of a need to develop a biosensor that could 
help differentiate between strains of schistosomiasis. 
This should be possible if specific motifs can be 
identified. 
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Discussion in the schistosome biosensor 
case study
Existence of schistosomiasis hybrids
Following Webster’s talk one participant 
asked if the changes in livestock farming 
are one of the main drivers of increased 
hybridisation between schistosomiasis 
strains, because (as was described in the 
talk) farmers are now moving their cattle 
over larger distances. Joanne Webster 
responded that her current hypothesis is 
indeed that this is one of the main drivers, 
especially because farmers are now routinely following 
their animals into the water, thereby increasing the 
interaction between human and animal parasites. 
Research is currently underway to test this hypothesis. 
Another participant asked whether knowledge about the 
existence of different species and hybrids was due to 
the availability of new detection technologies. Joanne 
Webster responded that this had been suspected for 
years, but the use of DNA barcoding and whole-genome 
sequencing (which is too expensive to do widely), had 
demonstrated the presence of hybrids, and also how 
dynamic the situation was.
Current testing methods
Another participant asked how detection of 
schistosomes is currently conducted. Joanne Webster 
explained that typically they use sentinel rodents that are 
deployed in the field and then collected for tests to be 
conducted on, but this process can take 6-8 weeks. In 
China cercariae meters are used.
Detecting the presence of a schistosome versus 
distinguishing between species
During the discussion it became apparent that there 
are two different possible goals: one is to just detect 
the presence of any schistosome, and the other is to 
identify the specific species present. The initial design of 
the biosensor aimed to detect S. mansoni as a proof of 
principle. If it turned out that different species produce 
sufficiently different variants of the elastase, then the 
biosensor could easily be modified to detect different 
strains, because of its modular nature. In this scenario, 
the biosensor system could contain a series of tests for 
different variants. At this stage there is little knowledge 
globally about any differences between the elastase 
produced by different species and it may be necessary 
to change the biosensor’s target to detect other species. 
The initial design focused on elastase produced by 
S. mansoni, which is known to be 98% similar to S. 
haematobium, so it unclear how easy it will be to 
design biosensors based on targeting elastase that can 
distinguish between species. 
“Is this biosensor for a 
researcher to find out the 
fundamentals of parasite 
biology or is it for public health 
initiatives on the ground?”
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Contacts at the Upstream Alliance26 had indicated that 
being able to ascertain whether snails were infected 
with any schistosome would in itself be useful, and once 
a device has detected cercariae, other features of the 
environment can be used to determine the species; but 
Joanne Webster believed that ultimately some level of 
typing would be necessary. One participant expressed 
the view that tackling this issue should be seen as a 
more crucial component of Responsible Research and 
Innovation than thinking about possible environmental 
risks and user-friendly features such as which kind 
of coloured outputs the biosensor should produce. A 
member of the team felt that at this stage, the project 
is just trying to demonstrate proof-of-concept for the 
biosensor and the protein target could be changed later 
on.
Stakeholder engagement
Another participant asked if any stakeholder 
engagement has been attempted. Alex Webb explained 
that the team’s primary point of contact has been 
26 http://www.theupstreamalliance.org/about.html
27 The original iGEM project engaged with global health experts, designers, and synthetic biologists at the Schistosome Control Initiative, The 
Royal College of Art, London School of Hygeine and Tropical Medicine and the BIOS research centre, now incorporated into the Department 
of Global Health & Social Medicine at KCL. 
the Upstream Alliance, a US-based international 
partnership of scientists and private and state funders 
seeking to reduce the prevalence of schistosomiasis by 
repopulating aquatic ecosystems with African prawns, 
which are voracious predators of the snails that carry the 
schistosome parasite. As yet the Imperial College team 
had not spoken to anyone from regions in Africa where 
their sensor would be deployed, but have relied on 
the expertise of Professor Mike Doenhoff (a workshop 
participant) and those in the Upstream Alliance, who 
themselves collaborate with people in these regions27.
Who is this biosensor for?
One participant asked about the intended purpose 
and envisaged user of the biosensor, pointing out that 
this would determine who the relevant 
stakeholders are. If the purpose is to map 
and monitor the prevalence of different 
species of schistosomes around the world, 
then the primary stakeholders would be 
schistosomiasis researchers such as 
Joanne Webster, who is easily accessible 
to researchers at Imperial College since 
she is right here in London. Since Webster 
had stated that her priority is to be able 
to differentiate between species and to be 
able to study the presence of hybrids, this 
would provide a specific brief for the project. 
Alternatively, if the purpose is to enable 
some kind of public health intervention on 
the ground, the relevant stakeholders would 
be different and they might not care so much about 
which species is present. It may be possible to engineer 
the biosensor so that it can fulfil both goals, but it would 
be useful to clearly distinguish them. These were two 
“People on the ground aiming to 
reduce infection might require 
a simpler version, whereas 
a lab would want something 
engineered to be more 
sensitive”
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different scenarios and the team were unsure about 
which direction to pursue28. 
A member of the team agreed that this is an important 
issue to consider, as they might want to create a more 
basic version of the biosensor that is easier to use (e.g. 
does not need a cold chain) but is less sensitive for 
use by the people in the field, and a different one that 
is more sophisticated and more sensitive, for use in a 
laboratory setting. 
Another participant sugested that there could also be 
an intermediate scenario, where the biosensor would be 
used to assess the relative success of different kinds 
of public health interventions, for example 
treating children with drugs only during term 
time or also during the school holidays; 
or testing the impact of different kinds of 
behaviour change.
Potential for false positive test results
One participant asked whether the design 
of the biosensor would allow the bacteria 
to distinguish between the protease from the parasite 
and the proteases of different bacteria  present in the 
water sample. Alex Webb responded that, as previously 
highlighted, the team were currently investigating this 
problem, and that the ideal field solution would include 
controls to test for this. 
The delivery of the biosensor to the field
Another participant asked how the team see the 
biosensor being rolled out in low resource contexts, 
where there is no easy access to sophisticated 
laboratories. The response was that freeze-dried Bacillus 
could be sent out in a vial and when a sample of water 
was added this would revive the bacteria and the 
28 The team have subsequently begun to narrow these option down, identifying an epidemiological route as fruitful. See Webb et al (2016) 
Scientific Reports
biosensor gene circuit would be expressed. Some of 
the biosensor components need to be located on the 
cell surface and this poses an additional challenge. One 
way to circumvent this issue would be to use a cell-free 
system. Overall, however, this project was not as far 
advanced as the arsenic biosensor project and was just 
beginning to tackle these issues.
What would users do with positive test results?
A participant asked what could be done in situations 
where the presence of schistosomiasis is detected in the 
water. A member of the team expressed the view that 
the biosensor was ‘just a tool’ and that people on the 
ground could decide how best to use it for public health. 
Joanne Webster explained that experience had shown 
that killing the snails with pesticides is not a feasible 
solution and expressed the view that eliminating the 
parasite entirely was not a realistic aim, except perhaps 
in some islands. She stressed that a biosensor would 
be particularly useful to identify areas where the parasite 
is being transmitted. People and livestock can then be 
treated with drugs to try to break the parasite’s life cycle; 
but experience had shown that once an area had been 
cleared, re-infection often occurs. A rapid and cheap 
biosensor would be useful to quickly identify the source 
of re-infection. 
“Some of these tools require 
infrastructure that simply isn’t 
there”
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When is elastase released?
One participant recalled that the elastase the biosensor 
is designed to detect is only released by the cercariae 
when they make contact with the skin of their host 
because it is part of the invasion mechanism. This 
means that even if the parasite is present, the enzyme 
may not be detected in the water. Alex Webb responded 
that the elastase is continually produced by the 
cercariae and it is possible that it may be released 
without direct contact with the host. The team is 
considering designing a trap that includes a membrane 
to attract the parasites and make them release the 
enzyme as if it were infecting a host. The biosensor 
would then be used to test a water sample from that 
trap. This is an approach that has been previously 
demonstrated but it would also make the technology 
less easy to use.
Regulation of whole-cell and cell-free systems
One participant asked about what the team were 
considering in terms of regulatory procedures being 
considered to ensure safety. Webb responded that 
this would partly depend on the results of the arsenic 
biosensor application discussed in the morning 
sessions, but that the cell-free version could be a good 
alternative strategy. The whole-cell system could be 
used to validate designs, but the cell-free system may 
be better for use in the field because in his opinion it 
would be safe to release into the environment. Cell-
free systems do not contain viable cells, just the cell 
machinery necessary to express the genes. They do 
however contain DNA, and potential plasmid DNA that 
could perhaps be taken up by native bacteria.
A member of the schistosome biosensor project team 
solicited views on whether the cell-free system would 
be better than the whole-cell approach with respect 
to the issue of ‘release’ into the environment. Warne 
explained that in his opinion a cell-free biosensor would 
lie outside of existing GMO regulations, because it 
would not be regarded as containing a microorganism 
that can replicate and transfer genetic material. Another 
participant argued that the question of asking ‘would 
cell-free be better’ can mean different things, because 
different people will use different criteria to define what 
is better. For instance, is it just considered ‘better’ 
because it might be easier to get through safety 
regulations? 
A related discussion followed about which option might 
be cheaper, and which would be easier to incorporate 
into a user-friendly device. Ultimately this would depend 
on the precise design for the biosensor and at this stage 
a number of technical options were being investigated, 
so it was not possible to make any categorical 
statement about which option would be cheaper. It was 
pointed out that the cell-free system was useful during 
the design stage as it enabled researchers to iteratively 
test alternative designs faster than using whole-cells 
systems. Additionally, the term ‘cell-free’ covers many 
different things. For example, transcriptional and post-
translational biosensors (described in Paul Freemont’s 
talk) would not involve the use of DNA. Members of 
the team explained that a key anticipated advantage of 
cell-free systems was the much shorter time needed 
to obtain results. The cell-free systems currently being 
tested in the lab gave results in approximately 30 
minutes. In contrast, the whole-cell system involved 
growing bacterial cells overnight then setting up the test, 
leaving it overnight again, and then conducting another 
operation that took two hours.
One member of the team also suggested that giving 
local users access to a living self-replicating organism 
was a powerful thing. People could interact with it in a 
somewhat similar way to microorganisms used in home 
brewing (although in practice local users were not really 
expected to interact with the living organism as it was 
intended to be kept within a sealed tube, similar to the 
one that had been designed for the arsenic biosensor).
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Relative safety of cell-free systems
A participant pointed out that as the schistosome 
cell-free biosensor is using plasmid DNA, this might 
be transferred to naturally competent bacteria. If used 
outside a lab, you would not be deliberately releasing 
a GMO into the environment, but you could be 
unintentionally creating a GMO in the field. If so, why 
not include something in the plasmid DNA, such as 
a ‘kill gene’, to help prevent the survival of organisms 
that take up the DNA? Members of the team explained 
that they had been thinking about this. They could for 
example build on previous work at Imperial College’s 
Centre for Synthetic Biology and Innovation to design a 
‘GeneGuard’29 that would severely reduce unintentional 
plasmid propagation from an engineered bacteria. It 
would also be possible to ensure that the biosensor 
DNA does not contain elements that would give an 
organism a positive selection advantage, such as 
antibiotic resistance genes routinely used during the 
design stage. Another option that had not been tested 
yet was to use linear DNA fragments instead of circular 
plasmids. A participant highlighted that linear DNA 
fragments could still pose a problem if homologous 
recombination regions were present. 
It was also pointed out that any novel GMO created 
would be inside a sealed vial and would not pose an 
environmental risk as long as it remained contained in 
that vial. However, this meant that, as with the arsenic 
biosensor, disposal issues will have to be considered. A 
team member suggested that barcoding the biosensor 
organisms could perhaps provide the means to track the 
extent of dissemination in the environment.
The overall tenor of this discussion was that the cell-free 
system approach could be considered a viable strategy, 
but that it could still pose safety concerns and one 
participant suggested that there would still need to be 
29 See: Wright, O., Delmans, M., Stan, G.-B. and Ellis, T. (2015). GeneGuard: A Modular Plasmid System Designed for Biosafety. ACS 
Synthetic Biology 4: 307−316.
guidelines to ensure safety, even if it did not fall within 
current regulatory definitions of a ‘genetically modified 
organism’.
This issue was returned to on several occasions during 
the session. Later on one participant argued that the 
fact that cell-free systems would not be defined as a 
GMO by regulatory authorities meant that they might 
be more applicable and acceptable for certain kinds 
of applications, for example products used in a clinical 
environment. Another participant questioned the 
correlation between broader acceptability and whether 
or not a product is regulated.
Managing expectations in Global Health
One of the participants drew attention to the grand claim 
of the WHO that schistosomiasis was to be eliminated. 
Such claims had been made in the past for a number 
of diseases and it could be argued that they can 
have detrimental effects. They pointed out that one of 
the important messages from Responsible Research 
and Innovation was that it was important to manage 
expectations in order to avoid creating unreasonable 
expectations about what can be delivered. Joanne 
Webster explained that she considered grand claims 
about eliminating schistosomiasis by 2020 to be bizarre, 
and is concerned that such claims do indeed set us up 
for failure. However, policy people she collaborates with 
tend to think that such claims are necessary to gather 
political support and increased funding for an issue. In 
that context stressing the complexity and dynamic nature 
of the biology of the disease may not be helpful.
Engagement with local stakeholders
One participant drew attention to the fact that at the 
time a lack of funding was preventing the schistosome 
biosensor team from visiting the African regions in 
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which their biosensor is intended to be used. Were 
there lessons here for researchers who are not used to 
attempting such research, and the problems with getting 
funding to do so? 
A member of the team agreed that this was a challenge 
and there were important questions that they wanted to 
address: did local people really want such a biosensor? 
Would it be useful? What features would they want to be 
incorporated? At the same time, it would be important to 
stress that the team were only working with prototypes at 
the moment and simply wanted to carry out field tests. 
Visiting regions of the world where the biosensor might 
be used would also give the team an idea of the local 
laboratory facilities, although this could also be obtained 
by speaking with Joanne Webster and members of 
the Upstream Alliance. Discussions with this group 
had for example revealed that local labs are typically 
on a flatbed truck, and this had changed the way in 
which members of the team envisaged what would 
be technically possible in the local context. Another 
participant noted that it was often difficult to judge which 
factors – the technical or the social – had the most 
impact on funding decisions.
‘Bench to bedside’ or ‘bedside to bench’?
One participant suggested that the project appeared to 
follow a ‘bench to bedside’ logic of translation, where 
scientists work in a lab to try to resolve a technical 
problem and then take their research to ‘the bedside’. 
It was argued that we know from past experience that 
such approaches take a very long time, and that very 
few things that are designed on the bench actually get 
30 Morris, Z.S., Wooding, S. & Grant, J., (2011). The answer is 17 years, what is the question: understanding time lags in translational research. 
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 104(12), 510–520.
31 Debates about the most appropriate approaches for the delivery of health sometimes make a distinction between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
approaches: “Horizontal approaches tend to incorporate several health interventions as part of a comprehensive primary care approach, 
usually delivered through government health facilities. Vertical programmes, on the other hand, tend to deliver selected interventions, often 
independently, with specialised management, logistics, and delivery mechanisms.” (Victora CG, Hanson K, Bryce J and Vaughan JP (2004) 
Achieving universal coverage with health interventions. The Lancet 364(9444): 1541-1548). Note that this distinction was familiar to only a 
few workshop participants.
to the bedside30. It may therefore be better to start at 
the bedside: to go out there to see how people manage 
their water supply, the skills they have, and the kinds 
of equipment they already use. You could then bring 
back some of what is ‘out there’ back into the lab. For 
example, you could bring infected water back to the lab. 
You could try to replicate some of the local conditions 
in the laboratory, instead of necessarily having to travel 
there, which is quite expensive. A key point is that the 
design of the biosensor would be built on the basis of 
knowledge about how people in the affected regions live 
and work, rather than developing a device in the lab and 
then finding out later that you need to go through many 
iterations of tinkering for the device to work in local 
conditions.
One participant disagreed that the traditional ‘bench to 
bedside’ model of translation was not effective. They felt 
that industrial translation was a well-trodden path that 
traditionally involves partnerships with large companies 
who have expertise in how to translate research projects 
into successful products such as medical devices. The 
projects being discussed today were only one part of 
the process and the next stage would be industrial 
translation.
Vertical technological interventions in Global Health
The point above was emphasised by another participant 
who argued that experience has shown that ‘vertical’31 
technological interventions in Global Health, that 
focus on one particular disease, have not been very 
successful when they are not connected in meaningful 
ways to more upstream causes of the problems being 
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addressed. This means that it is very important not 
only to conduct stakeholder engagement but also to 
take into account the social and environmental context. 
This participant felt that the way in which the project 
had been described seemed to address some of the 
environmental context, but not the social context. 
In response a member of the team reiterated that the 
team had begun to make arrangements to try and 
visit groups working in situ, but that the specific social 
context was still unclear. In that respect, there was a 
lot of scope for further development of the biosensor 
to be shaped by growing knowledge from this context. 
They also explained that the goal of the biosensor is to 
detect the presence of parasites, not to eliminate the 
parasite or provide a cure. Detection would be part of 
a bigger picture. With respect to environmental factors, 
the biosensor would provide useful information about 
the presence of different species of schistosomes in 
different areas in the world, and how these might be 
shifting in response to environmental factors such as 
global climate change.
Webster explained the Schistosomiasis Control Initiative 
(SCI) follows a horizontal approach where all the drug 
treatment programmes are implemented through 
local school teachers and village chiefs and that as 
far as possible local people are being trained to do 
the collecting, sampling and measuring themselves 
(though this was not feasible for the final stage of 
genetic typing). Experience had shown that local people 
were interested and keen to get involved. She believed 
that this was one reason for the success of the SCI. 
The local scientific partners know the local village 
leaders and the infected sites and therefore provide 
crucial expertise. This meant that if and when the 
schistosomiasis biosensor is shown to work, it could be 
integrated into these existing control programmes.
32 As of 2017, the team are now pursuing such a route.
Later, Webster also explained that the SCI works with 
local ministries of education and of research, who play 
the leading role in their own countries. In each country 
there are scientific co-investigators, and she and her 
colleagues travel to those countries regularly. Certain 
research funders, such as DFID require projects to be 
interdisciplinary and to include social sciences as well 
as clinical sciences and veterinary sciences; and this 
was the general trend.
The biosensor is just a tool that can be used for 
different purposes
Following on from the above, a team member also 
explained that, because of the way in which it was 
being designed, the biosensor was a tool or technology 
that could be used for many purposes. For example, 
it could perhaps be used to detect bacterial infection 
or to identify proteases that could be used in washing 
powders. In the case of schistosomiasis, there were still 
several different ways it could be used including, for 
instance, in epidemiological studies32.
When should the biosensor leave the lab?
Members of the team also expressed the view that 
until the biosensor was shown to work in laboratory 
conditions, there was little point taking it to the field, 
where conditions would be very messy. The team 
realised that there would be substantial work to be done 
in due course to further optimise the biosensor for it 
to work in the field compared to laboratory conditions. 
Also, until the researchers know that the device is likely 
to work, it may be a waste of limited resources (such as 
research funding and money and local people’s time) 
to conduct stakeholder engagement; it may be better to 
wait until you have a technical object that works.
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A team member described two extreme situations to 
highlight the tension. If the team travelled to a country 
in Africa before having a working prototype or data to 
show proof-of-concept, asking people to tell them what 
they want, they could be accused of ‘going on a nice 
jolly.’ The other extreme would be for researchers to 
stay within their labs saying that they were working on 
something that is useful to society but with no contact 
to the world outside. Clearly teams working on global 
health projects need to tread a middle ground, where 
a more horizontal kind of engagement occurs as  it is 
clear that the idea is technically feasible. They noted 
that the schistosomiasis biosensor project had probably 
reached that point now. Indeed, the team had already 
had conversations over Skype with local experts and 
this had proved very useful. For example, when these 
local stakeholders explained the technique they currently 
employ to collect the parasites using a filter, the team 
began to envisage how their biosensor might be 
incorporated into their protocol.
This led again to a discussion about whether or not, 
and at what stage, it would be useful to engage with 
stakeholders and potential users. One participant 
suggested that early engagement might help clarify what 
was wanted, what the different potential uses might be 
(it could for example help determine whether a whole-
cell biosensor that requires growing the bacteria for 48 
hours would be feasible and in which places). Others 
felt that it was better to wait until the researchers had 
obtained some firm results and published papers, and 
were ready for industrial translation. The question of 
when to engage was a recurring theme throughout the 
day.
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Reflections
The final session of the day began with five-minute invited ‘responses’ from three participants with expertise 
in the use of technologies in Global Health contexts. Their goals were to summarise key points from the 
discussions so far, and to identify issues that they felt were important but which had not been raised. This was 
followed by a closing discussion.
33 See: Grimshaw DJ (2012). Toward Pro-Poor Nano-Innovation (Zimbabwe, Peru, Nepal) in Nanotechnology and Global Sustainability, D. 
Maclurcan and N. Radywyl (Eds.) CRC Press: London.
Watu Wamae, African Centre for Technology Studies 
and Cambridge-Africa
 > Began by saying that having such biosensors, 
even if they only raise awareness without providing 
a treatment should be considered a significant step
 > Returned to the question of ‘who defines the 
problem?’ and whether developing a technology 
first and then going out there to see what problem 
it can solve is an appropriate approach; and 
argued that the answer to these questions will 
depend on the kinds of problems being addressed.
 > Recommended that ‘end users’ should be seen 
in terms of producers rather than simply users: 
technologies tend to work better in situations 
where people feel they can engage with them and 
reconfigure them when needed. This could mean 
being able to repair the technology when it breaks 
down, or reconfiguring it so that it is better adapted 
to different contexts.
 > If there is no suitable infrastructure (e.g. 
laboratories) then the focus should perhaps be 
on helping to create that infrastructure. Projects 
should engage with what little knowledge base 
exists and help to build it up so that it can become 
a crucial ‘face on the ground.’ This would help 
avoid a situation where the technology is seen as 
coming from the outside. This may take longer 
but is likely to produce solutions that are more 
organic. Once this infrastructure is there, bringing 
in a new technological solution (e.g. a new drug 
or a biosensor) is less problematic. The SCI 
programmes described by Joanne Webster were a 
good example of how engaging with existing local 
infrastructures such as deworming programmes 
in schools run by Ministries of Education enabled 
local people to be trained and to take responsibility 
for the success of the control programmes.
 > Stressed the useful role that social scientists can 
play to understand how the local social context 
might affect the desired impact of the technology.
David Grimshaw, ICT4D Centre, Royal Holloway, 
University of London
 > Stressed that we have a lot of previous experience 
of successful stakeholder engagement, for 
example in the field of nanotechnology. This 
experience suggests that there is an alternative 
to the notion that ‘we have to prove the science 
first’33.
 > The ultimate outcome of successful stakeholder 
engagement isn’t necessarily a technology or 
the solution to a particular problem. Getting 
different communities to engage with each other 
to systematically look at a nexus of problems 
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and solutions can be seen as an important 
achievement in itself.
 > From his experience of stakeholder engagement 
with nanotechnologies in Peru, Zimbabwe and 
Nepal, Grimshaw had learnt that it can be more 
fruitful to begin discussion by focusing on the 
problem at stake and the interplay of related 
cultural, social and economic issues, rather than 
with the technology. In other words, to take the 
stance of a ‘technology agnostic’. When this was 
done in Nepal, it led to a reasonable diagnostic of 
the problems and inter-relationships between them, 
from different points of view.
 > One important group of stakeholders - that was 
not represented at this workshop - was local 
scientists. It is important to recognise that they can 
be competent enough to understand the potential 
of the technology being discussed and to engage 
with scientists from universities in the Global North.
 > Quoting Amartya Sen34, Grimshaw stressed his 
belief that development is about developing the 
capability of local people to lead the life they would 
choose for themselves.
 > Suggested that the so-called ‘translation’ process 
and stakeholder engagement should be seen 
as a design process, and design always starts 
with people. A key starting point is: who are you 
designing for? The design process involves built-in 
processes to obtain feedback and learning.
 > Aid-dependency was a key issue that had not been 
addressed so far in the discussions, and that is 
particularly predominant in Nepal.
34 See: Sen A (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
35 See Grimshaw DJ (2016) Inclusive innovation: Beyond the laboratory. In Agola, N.O., Hunter, A. Inclusive innovation for sustainable 
development: Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan UK
 > The timescales typically adopted by research 
funding bodies are problematic for these kinds 
of projects. A project that involves stakeholder 
engagement and the need to apply for regulatory 
approval, such as the Arsenic Biosensor project, 
cannot be realised within a 3-year grant. In 
Grimshaw’s opinion, research funders do not 
generally appreciate the importance of stakeholder 
engagement in actually getting something usable 
and used in the field, and do not recognise that 
this requires specialist expertise. As a result, it can 
be difficult to obtain funding for activities that go 
‘beyond the laboratory’35.
Mohga Kamal-Yanni, Senior health & HIV 
policy advisor, Oxfam GB
 > Reiterated what the two previous speakers had 
said with respect to the role of local stakeholders: 
it is important to recognise the capacity of local 
communities in the Global South to be involved 
not as consumers of science but as producers of 
science. These people can also produce benefits 
for humanity.
 > Transparency and better/earlier communication of 
the value and risks of ongoing work are essential. 
This should not be seen as a PR exercise, and it 
is important to treat the audience as adults who 
can understand what is at stake and make rational 
decisions. Their rationality might be different to our 
rationality, but it is still rational. This is particularly 
pertinent if the project is ultimately intended to 
benefit those people.
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 > If we are interested in producing high quality 
products that are usable, accessible and affordable 
we need to pay attention to intellectual property 
rules and to international free trade agreements. 
Experience with medicines, for example for HIV/
AIDS and cancer, has demonstrated how IP 
restricts people’s access to affordable medicines 
because it generates monopolies and leads to 
high prices. Developing wonderful medicines 
means nothing if the people who need them 
cannot access them. They might as well not have 
been invented. Free trade agreements also play an 
important role because they generally strengthen 
IP. The latest trade agreement being negotiated is 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and this includes sections that would 
provide stronger protection for pharmaceutical and 
other firms.
 > It is important to consider the role that will be 
played by industry. If products are going to be 
manufactured on a large-scale, industry will 
necessarily be involved. However, there are 
different models for industry involvement. For 
instance, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative (DNDi) works with pharmaceutical 
companies and research institutions in India and 
Brazil to pursue affordable medicines for neglected 
diseases. Some large pharmaceutical firms from 
the Global North issue voluntary licenses to 
generic comapanies in the Global South, but the 
licensing terms are often opaque. Additionally, 
companies in emerging markets can often produce 
products more cheaply than big pharma.
36 The International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition is a competition for undergraduate and postgraduate students that 
has played a key role in the global development of the field of synthetic biology. Based on a kit of biological parts, teams work over the 
summer to design and build biological systems and operate them in living cells. For further information, see: www.igem.org
37 The arsenic biosensor started as Edinburgh’s iGEM 2006 project, which won the ‘Best Real World Application’ prize (http://2006.igem.org/
University_of_Edinburgh_2006). The schistosome biosensor project started as Imperial College’s 2010 ‘Parasight’ project, which won the 
‘Best Human Practices Advance’ prize (http://2010.igem.org/Team:Imperial_College_London#).
 > Who is going to pay for these biosensors? 
Campaigns by NGOs have played an important 
role in the establishment of the Global Fund 
for HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria by making these 
diseases into political issues; and continued 
lobbying has been necessary to ensure that 
donors continue to replenish this fund.
 > The way in which new technology is integrated 
into local health systems is crucial. Horizontal - 
health system based - rather than vertical - disease 
specific - approaches are more likely to lead to 
sustainable, usable and affordable products.
 > Reflecting on the tenor of discussions at the 
workshop that day she explained how surprised 
she was that some participants seemed to assume 
that all NGOs necessarily attack science. Speaking 
about her own organisation (Oxfam), this was not 
and had never been the case. More stakeholder 
dialogues could perhaps help dispel such 
misunderstandings. Groups such as NGOs should 
not be seen as antagonists, but collaborators who 
approach the problem from different perspectives 
and can enable scientists to see things that they 
would not otherwise have seen.
Closing discussion
The role of iGEM36 in framing synthetic biology projects
One participant reflected on how it is interesting to 
note that both of the projects discussed began life as 
iGEM projects37, where the emphasis is primarily on 
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finding problems that synthetic biology could solve and 
on developing applications for synthetic biology. This 
participant was impressed at the way in which both 
projects had broadened this agenda but nevertheless 
what we had heard about the experience of both 
projects demonstrated how problematic it can be to 
start with the question of ‘what problems can we find 
that synthetic biology can solve?’ This was perhaps 
particularly problematic in the area of Global Health 
because this is a field that is complex and requires 
overlapping disciplinary expertise. Synthetic biology may 
be a component in addressing Global Health problems, 
but will not be the whole solution.
Who sets the research agenda? 
There was a wide-ranging discussion about how 
research agendas are, or should be, set, and by whom. 
One participant believed that researchers set the 
agenda, and felt that this was appropriate. In contrast, 
another participant noted that such decisions were 
political and needed to come out of conversations that 
take in a wide array of perspectives and stakeholders. 
As a researcher, they did not feel that they would want 
to impose the agenda. This question permeated the 
following discussion.
One participant argued that the very idea of anybody 
setting the agenda for scientific research was worrying. 
For example, the work of Watson and Crick on the 
structure of DNA had not been supported by their 
institution and yet it is now recognised as one of the 
most important scientific discoveries of the twentieth 
century. 
Addressing Grand Societal Challenges requires 
attention to the broader context
One participant noted that one way to set the agenda 
was for funders to set ‘Grand Challenges’ but that 
these were often not popular with researchers, with 
many believing that they led to bad science and forced 
researchers into interdisciplinary projects when they did 
not see the need for interdisciplinarity. This participant 
argued that if one took a ‘Grand Challenge’ approach, 
dealing with schistosomiasis would arguably be high 
on the agenda. But having decided on this as a goal, 
an array of different interventions would be needed, 
beyond a biosensor, such as stopping shepherds going 
into the water with their flocks or stopping people from 
defecating in the water, so the biosensor would need to 
be built into a coherent programme of transformation. 
The biosensor is important, but it needs to be thought 
of in a broader context if we are trying to address 
a grand societal challenge. If not, it is likely that the 
device, however fantastic in technical terms, will only 
have a minimal impact on health outcomes. This linked 
in with the earlier comment about how highly technical 
solutions that are vertically dropped into the situation 
often fail and can even produce antagonism. It was well 
known that this was often the approach adopted by the 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It was important to 
learn from past experience where this had not proved 
successful.
Good solutions for us, but only ‘good enough’ solutions 
for them
Another participant followed this up using the 
example of malaria. The common approach is to use 
technological solutions such as bed nets and pesticides. 
However, we know how to eradicate malaria, because 
we have done it in the Global North (for example 
in Montreal where malaria was once endemic): by 
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covering stagnant water, providing sanitation and other 
infrastructure that also provides a better quality of life 
for people. These are the ‘good’ solutions, yet we insist 
on providing only ‘good enough’ solutions to regions 
in the Global South, instead of more ‘upstream’38 
solutions such as tackling inequities between and within 
countries. Technologies have a role to play, but if they 
are disconnected from these larger issues their impact 
will not be as beneficial as it could be.
Innovation competitions as a means to set the research 
agenda
There was a discussion about whether innovation 
competitions could be a useful model for setting 
research agendas. One example was the 2008 Granger 
Foundation $1 million Challenge Prize for 
Sustainability for removing arsenic from 
contaminated well water in Bangladesh, 
where the winner had developed the Sono 
filter. One participant argued that the filter 
was very effective at removing arsenic from 
water, but over time it had became clear 
that it was not necessarily the most effective 
method to reduce people’s exposure to 
arsenic, because it was relatively expensive 
and therefore not distributed equitably39. They suggested 
that this was perhaps linked to the fact that the 
competition adopted an engineering perspective.
Two workshop participants reported that they were 
engaged in the ongoing Longitude Prize challenge that 
is offering £10 million to help solve the problem of 
global antibiotic resistance. In this case the challenge 
38 In the literature on Global Health, authors sometimes distinguish between ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ social determinants of health.’ 
Downstream determinants pertain to medical care and personal behavior, while upstream determinants include working and living conditions 
in homes and communities as well as economic and social opportunities and resources. Some authors argue that most interventions tend 
to target ‘downstream’ determinants and not enough attention is paid to ‘upstream determinants.’ See for example: Braveman PS, Egerter, 
Williams DR (2011). The social determinants of health: coming of age. Annual Review of Public Health 32: 381-398.
39 See: Shafiquzzaman M, Azam MS, Mishima I, Nakajima J. (2009). Technical and Social Evaluation of Arsenic Mitigation in Rural 
Bangladesh. Journal of Health, Population, and Nutrition 27(5):674-683.
had been set in consultation with members of the 
public. They felt that the prize was unlikely to generate a 
solution to the problem, but that it had served to focus 
attention on the issue and to bring together people to 
tackle it.
Intellectual property
One participant took the opportunity to clarify that 
intellectual property was not discussed that day in 
relation to the arsenic biosensor simply because they 
felt it was not part of the agenda that day. Nevertheless, 
at the root of it, synthetic biology is intended to be an 
open source technology that is open to everyone. That 
is the ambition. There will be IP issues, and these are 
complicated by university obligations, and funding body 
obligations. IP is not always about freedom to make 
money but freedom to operate. The arsenic biosensor 
team are working with the latter understanding.
Another participant suggested that the open source 
ambitions will likely impinge upon their chances of 
scaling up. Large industrial partners typically ask first 
what your IP portfolio is, and such companies simply 
“No one in this room has the 
legitimacy to set a research 
agenda on their own”
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will not be interested in open source. You will therefore 
likely end up having to rely upon governments and 
organisations such as the Gates Foundation.
During the whole day, it appeared that some participants 
felt that avoiding partnerships with large firms and not 
applying for patents was the best way forward, whereas 
others felt that collaborations with large firms would 
be necessary and desirable in order to commercialise 
biosensors.
Manufacture
Another participant emphasised that the nature of 
some of these technologies, for instance cell-free, does 
open up room for very different kinds of manufacturing 
processes that perhaps do not require the involvement 
of large industrial partners. 
One participant emphasised that having a vision for the 
kind of manufacturing process, and industrial partner 
or business that you want to become, needs to be 
considered as early as possible because it will direct 
a number of different translation decisions. Another 
participant emphasised that translation is precisely the 
kind of process that has been the subject of much study 
in the social sciences, and this evidence base can be 
used to inform the decisions for these biosensors going 
forwards. Translation is an exceedingly difficult process 
that takes far longer than most people realise and which 
often simply does not succeed. 
Giving people in the Global South the chance to 
participate in synthetic biology research
One participant pointed out that a number of 
participants had talked about synthetic biology as 
though the intention was to see this science adopted 
and flourish in the developing countries within which 
these projects worked. They wanted to know more about 
40 https://openplant.org/
this ambition and whether or not it was feasible. One 
participant responded that absolutely this was part of 
the ambition but was again a very complex issue. iGEM 
is one vehicle for achieving this and efforts are being 
made to include teams from Asia and Africa. The work 
of the BBSRC/EPSRC OpenPlant Synthetic Biology 
Research Centre40 was also cited, as evidence of how 
synthetic biologists are trying to create the basic parts 
and hardware for these new technologies in such a way 
that they are available to everyone. They have also been 
involved in meeting with companies to try and develop 
bioparts that can survive a wide range of environmental 
conditions, making them accessible to countries that 
might not otherwise have the cold storage facilities 
necessary. 
The latter point was used for further discussion on 
increasing participation in the international research 
process through those involved in initiatives such as 
iGEM. At this point one participant made reference 
to the efforts of DIY biologists who often face harsh 
limitations on their access to equipment, and who might 
be able to offer suggestions regarding how to organise 
a more dispersed research network in the future. 
Another participant explained that in some regions of the 
world, electricity can only be provided for limited parts of 
the day and even then supply can be intermittent. So in 
that respect there is some scientific research that simply 
could not be conducted in those regions. In response 
to this point, one participant explained that perhaps 
rather than assuming their laboratory work needs to be 
of the same kind as that which goes on in Cambridge, 
there may well be numerous other kinds of research that 
could be pursued in these other regions of the world.
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The first part of this report summarised the 
presentations and the discussions that occurred during 
the day, replicating as accurately as possible what was 
said by workshop participants, without commenting 
on those statements, and without endorsing any of the 
views expressed. In this second part of this report, the 
authors use their social science expertise to analyse 
those discussions, summarise what they consider to be 
the key findings, and reflect on the consequences of 
those discussions.
Part 2: Key themes and analysis
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Lessons: Understanding global health challenges
Problems are not easily isolated
Workshop participants’ discussions are littered with 
examples that draw attention to the complexity and 
multiplicity of global health challenges. Arsenic 
contamination is subject to physical geography (e.g. 
rainfall), which changes over the course of a year, 
meaning that the distribution of well contamination also 
changes over the year. Between just two localities, one 
can find very different histories of arsenic contamination 
which affect how the problem manifests for people. 
During discussion of the arsenic biosensor it became 
clear that the ‘health challenge’ was not just one of 
access to water, but also one of agriculture, education 
and social exclusion. Likewise, the challenges of 
addressing schistosomiasis as a phenomenon are 
evident. Many of the challenges that schistosomiasis 
presents stem from interactions between: the parasitic 
worms; treatment, management and intervention 
programmes; farming practices; physical geographies; 
and the movements of a wide range of animals (wild 
rodents, buffalo and snails, for example). This means 
that there are many possible users, several species 
with different biologies, and several different points of 
intervention for a biosensor project. 
The global health context of each 
biosensor project is uniquely distinct 
and extremely complex. Despite the 
importance of the idea of global health, 
it is fundamental to understand the 
local specificities if a project is to make 
a worthwhile intervention.
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Before advocating a synthetic biology 
based solution to a global health 
challenge, it is necessary to evaluate 
its benefits and potential drawbacks in 
relation to other potential approaches 
with which it may interact or even 
displace. Such an evaluation must look 
beyond techno-economic approaches 
to also include cultural and social 
dimensions.
41 See, for example the accelerated scale-up of water cisterns in the social technologies network by the Brazilian Government, Fressoli M, 
Abrol D, Smith A, Ely A, Dias R (2014) When grassroots innovation movements encounter mainstream institutions: implications for models 
of inclusive innovation. Innovation and Development, 4(2): 277–292.
There are always multiple possible 
solutions
There are multiple ways of ‘framing’ the problems that 
each biosensor aims to address. Multiple solutions 
are also possible. For example, arsenic contamination 
can be addressed through: diversification of dietary 
sources; removal using a range of technologies; 
well sharing; and / or infrastructural provisions of 
clean, piped water. Similarly, attempts to eradicate 
Schistosomiasis are being made through destruction of 
the parasitic worm but morbidity can also be controlled 
through the treatment of infected people. Alternatively, 
the incidence of infection can be reduced through 
changing practices, in this case by adapting farming 
practices. There have been examples when attempts to 
introduce a high-tech or mainstream solution to a health 
problem can actually degrade or reduce the capacity of 
locally developed approaches41. Indeed, given limited 
resources, sometimes the introduction of one approach 
may effectively exclude others that local stakeholders 
find more acceptable or appropriate.  If a technologically 
advanced approach such as that using synthetic 
biology is to be justifiable, therefore, it is important to 
review other approaches and explore whether this new 
approach is likely to be cheaper, easier to use, safer or 
more locally effective than other potential solutions, and 
also to evaluate whether it can, or even must, work in 
synergy with other approaches.
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Solutions are political as much as technical
Both projects aim to produce a technological solution 
to a global health challenge. However, both the framing 
of the problem and the framing of the solution are as 
much political as technical. The implementation of 
each solution would affect different people to different 
degrees, empowering some and disempowering others, 
supporting certain ways of making sense of the problem 
and marginalizing others.
In Bangladesh, arsenic contamination resulted from a 
previous technological intervention, and places poor 
farmers in one of the most vulnerable positions: not 
only are they are unable to vary their diet, they also 
perform laborious work and therefore consume more 
contaminated water and food. Similarly the ‘solution’ of 
arsenic testing has resulted in stigmatisation for some 
whose wells are found to be contaminated, whereas 
for others, contamination has been reduced by the 
installation and control of a deep tube well. 
Testing has wider political consequences because 
continued metricised monitoring can maintain the 
question of arsenic contamination as a matter of 
concern for political elites. However, implementing 
a regime of testing, and associated data collection, 
also has consequences, introducing monitoring, and 
raising questions of the ownership and control of water 
supplies.  Further, political dimensions are not limited to 
the geographical boundaries of the intervention, but also 
to the locale of production: the Arsenic Biosensor has 
become an accidental precedent case for contained use 
regulation in the European Commission.
42 See, Bijker WE (2009) How is technology made? – That is the question! Cambridge Journal of Economics, 34(1): 63–76.; Whatmore, SJ 
(2009) Mapping knowledge controversies: science, democracy and the redistribution of expertise. Progress in Human Geography, 33(5): 
587–598.
Innovating responsibly requires making 
politically-laden choices explicit in 
advance, reflecting on their desirability 
with key stakeholders, and offering 
ways of ameliorating those socio-
political consequences deemed to 
be problematic. Well-established 
methodologies such as actor and 
controversy mapping would be 
reasonable base requirements42.
Thus, testing is not a neutral act. While it may seem 
merely a technical option, introducing a regime of testing 
will have wider political, social, cultural and material 
consequences for the populations involved. Those 
who advocate building a biosensor for testing, and 
introducing it in a local context, are thus inevitably also 
intervening into local and even national politics. 
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Identifying pre-existing interventions to 
act as comparators – illustrating the 
different issues, understandings and 
framings – can help to successfully 
navigate complex health systems.
Biosensors are interventions into global 
health systems
Biosensors are not just passive tools, but intervene 
into complex relations among many actors who may 
understand and frame the problem and potential 
solutions in different, and even conflicting, ways. 
Existing testing kits for arsenic contamination provided 
a benchmark for design goals and constraints of the 
arsenic biosensor. They also provided indications as 
to the kinds of users that the biosensor will be used by 
and the social context in which they will be deployed. 
Crucially, they highlighted the problems that are posed 
about the value of testing – for arsenic but also for 
waterborne pathogens –  if no solution is available, 
either in the form of an alternative source of water, or 
through some means of decontamination or purification 
of existing water supplies.
However, as the case of schistosomiasis shows, it 
is not always simple to identify such comparators. 
Existing detection methods for schistosomiasis include: 
sentinel rodents which are released, caught and tested; 
Cercariae meters; a range of medical patient tests; and 
PCR-based detection for known transmission areas. 
While issues such as the presence or absence of a 
cold-chain to move the biosensor have been considered, 
it is not yet clear how the schistosomiasis biosensor will 
fit into this existing testing regime. There are multiple 
possible options to this end, indicated by the question 
of whether the aim is to assist public health experts 
to identify different species of schistosome or just to 
detect schistosome presence for citizens. The design 
of a biosensor will differ depending on which of these 
objectives is prioritised.
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Public and stakeholder knowledges are 
fundamental to good design
Much has been written about the role of perceived 
public concern and participation in shaping synthetic 
biology and emerging technologies more broadly. These 
two cases provide lessons regarding the value of public 
and stakeholder involvement in a way that may help to 
move discussions beyond solely ‘concern about public 
concern’43. They do so by demonstrating substantive 
rather than instrumental rationales for engagement, 
that is, they engage outsiders on the basis of their 
knowledge rather than on the sole basis of ‘smoothing 
through’ a technological intervention44. The example of 
the arsenic biosensor shows the benefits of such an 
approach: the team developing this sensor has pursued 
partnerships and engaged broadly, and field visits to 
specific locales have enabled them to take account of a 
wide range of unanticipated issues. Some of these, such 
as the sensor output, have been ‘designed-in’ to the 
technological device itself.
It is important to note that such processes of local 
field research and consultation require significant 
thought and preparation. For example, research has 
demonstrated that factors such as the person chosen 
to lead the engagement will shape access to particular 
groups within the communities and the responses 
given. Thus, care must be taken with the framing of 
such engagement work, ideally based on learning from 
previous work and its evaluation. It is necessary for all 
involved to believe that engagement is genuine, and 
not merely ‘box ticking’ and that insights from such 
engagement will be incorporated into the project, even 
where they are technically difficult. For example, in the 
case of the arsenic biosensor, the realisation that it was 
desirable to move from a gradated sensor to a traffic 
light system in the arsenic biosensor required a 
43 Marris, C (2015) The construction of imaginaries of the public as a threat to synthetic biology. Science as culture, 24(1): 83–98.
44 Marris C, Rose N (2010) Open Engagement: Exploring Public Participation in the Biosciences. PLoS Biology, 8(11): e1000549  
Sensitive engagement on the basis 
of expertise can provide a valuable 
way of making sense of complex 
problems and their potential solutions, 
but only if it comes with a genuine 
commitment to respond to the 
lessons of that engagement. Such a 
commitment may entail lengthy and 
expensive modifications to prototype 
interventions, and should not be made 
lightly.
significant amount of technical work, but did achieve its 
objective.
The example of the Schistosomiasis Biosensor shows 
the difficulties, and yet the necessity, of identifying the 
most appropriate intervention in the face of numerous 
possibilities in a complex challenge involving multiple 
human and animal actors and their forms of life. Well 
thought out public and stakeholder engagement, if 
pursued with a substantive rationale focussed on 
shaping and reshaping the intervention, is necessary 
in such situations to identify and resolve such key 
questions as who the appropriate ‘user’ might be, what 
the appropriate way of framing the problem might be, 
and how it will be embedded as one element within a 
complex treatment system.
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Institutional reflexivity: Tensions
45 This is a version of the longstanding ‘Collingridge Dilemma’ (Collingdridge, D. (1980) The Social Control of Technology. New York: 
St Martin’s Press) and the notion of ‘technological lock-in’ which have both been extensively discussed within the field of science and 
technology studies.
46 For example in 2016 it reportedly attracted approximately 3000 attendees from approximately 270 organisations, who raised approximately 
$15m in capital during the course of the year to fund their projects.
Technical fixes and lock-in
There is a long-running tension in social and 
technological change, which demonstrated in the above 
discussions about problem framings and solutions, 
and the value of integrating public and stakeholder 
knowledge into technological design. On the one hand 
projects must be made tangible and technical at an 
early stage, and not remain merely abstract ideas, which 
means making decisions and committing to particular 
framings. Yet, on the other hand, even some of the most 
basic assumptions built into those technical decisions 
must remain malleable, as new evidence and new ways 
of thinking emerge from engagement45.
In the current examples, it is notable that both 
biosensors emerged amalgamations of entries into 
the International Genetically Engineered Machine 
competition (iGEM). The competition was established, 
and continues to act as, a field-building institution for 
synthetic biology46. As such, it plays a significant role 
in both the agenda setting and framing of synthetic 
biology projects. Teams are encouraged to enter the 
competition, develop particular ‘genetic parts’ and 
build them into ‘devices’ which can be used to address 
problems. It thus positions the technical objects of 
synthetic biology as solutions to social challenges. 
The role of iGEM is important because beyond the 
institutional capital that the competition generates, it 
provides ways of making synthetic biology tangible. 
Yet, in a non-trivial way, it also embodies an approach 
in which synthetic biology is a solution in search of 
potential problems to which it can be applied. 
As each biosensor has moved from inception to 
application, it has proven necessary to move away from 
purely technical notions of problem and solution. It was 
after these projects had moved from iGEM projects to 
research council or charity-funded project that most 
of the significant changes, developments and social 
research took place. The Arsenic Biosensor team, 
funded by the Wellcome Trust, needed to change the 
genetic circuit designs in response to user feedback. 
As the projects continue to develop, activities such 
as the pursuit of regulatory approval and the receipt 
of research funding will begin to embed professional, 
financial, scientific and material capital, ‘locking-in’ 
more of their features. Nevertheless, even some rather 
basic features of the proposed solution may require 
modification. For example, it is conceivable that a 
protease-based biosensor may not be the most effective 
intervention for schistosomiasis.
This tension, between the need for closure and 
inevitable lock-in on the one hand, and the need for 
continuous adaptability on the other, is likely to become 
more important as research funders increasingly 
demand challenge-oriented research in which those 
who seek funding have, at very early stages, to claim a 
fit between their ‘solution’ and the problem it seeks to 
address.  Challenge based funding schemes must find 
ways to recognise, and indeed support, this need for 
flexibility and responsiveness.
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Regulatory definitions are being 
challenged
Biotechnologies are capable of challenging deeply 
held and common-sense categorisations of ourselves 
and the world that we inhabit (e.g. what is natural or 
unnatural). Regulation is one of the primary ways that 
social values regarding such technologies are codified. 
However, the workshop discussions suggest that several 
longstanding regulatory distinctions are either currently 
being challenged, or are likely be challenged in the 
future, by developments in molecular biology. Questions 
about whether current regulatory frameworks are 
appropriate and sufficient are therefore vital to address.
First, as alluded to above, the distinctions between 
regulatory pathways such as ‘contained use’ and 
‘deliberate release’ are being challenged. The Arsenic 
Biosensor Collaboration’s decision to pursue a path 
under the Contained Use EC Directive was one 
which was recommended to the project team by 
regulators but also one which felt more of an ‘honest’ 
definition, because the team did not feel they were 
deliberately releasing their engineered organism into 
the environment. Whilst this pathway has shaped the 
development of several containment mechanisms, 
it is not clear that such a pathway has produced an 
organism that is any more or less dangerous than if the 
team had pursued a deliberate release route. 
Second, cell-free biosensors were presented as a 
solution to regulatory hurdles and concerns regarding 
the safety of whole-cell biosensors. However, it is not 
clear that such biosensors present an ecological threat 
that is different to whole-cell systems, despite potentially 
falling outside current regulatory frameworks for GMOs, 
47  Kaebnick, G.E. et al. (2016). Precaution and governance of emerging technologies. Science, 354(6313) 710–711.
48  Outside the area of health, see for instance emerging social sustainability analyses developed within Raman, S. et al. (2015) Integrating 
social and value dimensions into sustainability assessment of lignocellulosic biofuels. Biomass and Bioenergy, 82: 49–62 and Wiek A 
et al. (2012) Sustainability and Anticipatory Governance in Synthetic Biology. International Journal of Social Ecology and Sustainable 
Development, 3(2): 25–38.
in that these types of biosensors are not ‘genetically 
modified organisms’. A product falling outside the 
scope of current regulation is not necessarily a mark 
of its safety. Conversely, as is seen with the arsenic 
biosensor case, being mired in a regulatory ‘thicket’ 
is not necessarily reflective of any inherent risk to the 
environment or human health. 
Much debate regarding applications using modern 
molecular biology hinges on disputes about whether 
regulations should target the ‘product’ or the ‘processes’ 
used to produce applications. One problem is that both 
refer to highly technical assessments in tightly controlled 
conditions which fail to account for the wider social 
and environmental factors that would apply if translated 
to the domain of their intended use. Recognising the 
multiple characteristics that can be used to deem a 
device to be ‘better’ implies that an assessment that 
looks beyond technical evaluations in tightly-bounded 
experimental conditions would be desirable. Recent 
attempts to adopt precautionary positions in relation to 
gene drives go some way to achieving this47, but there 
are precedents, embodied in certification standards and 
social sustainability assessment, that do not separate 
product from process and that if implemented carefully, 
may be fruitful avenues for exploration48.
Competing models of innovation and 
translation
A significant amount of discussion in the workshop 
stemmed from participants’ differing assumptions 
about the most appropriate models of technological 
intervention into Global Health challenges. These can 
be summarised as ‘bench to bedside’ on the one hand, 
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and ‘bedside to bench’ on the other. In the former, the 
assumed model of intervention is of a technology being 
developed in a laboratory and then being ‘dropped in’ 
to its context of use. In the latter, a technology would be 
developed alongside prolonged engagement with end 
users or ideally would be developed by such end users 
incorporating knowledge and existing local processes 
of innovation. Corresponding parallels can be drawn 
between these approaches and vertical / horizontal 
models of health intervention; a vertical intervention 
would likely seek to deliver a single intervention whereas 
a horizontal intervention would work with agencies and 
actors in the context to deliver a suite of interventions 
and modification to best address the challenge / cluster 
of challenges.
These assumed models of translation and intervention 
are important to unpack for several reasons. First, 
they represent significantly different, but rarely aired, 
mentalities underpinning global health projects. The 
underpinning model will significantly impact the ability 
of a project to respond to the ‘lessons’ drawn from 
this workshop. For instance, if a vertical approach is 
taken then it will be almost impossible to incorporate 
knowledge of the local context into the design of the 
project’s intervention. Second, neither model is without 
its problems. Against a backdrop of pathways to 
impact on the one hand, and a widely perceived ‘valley 
of death’ in the move from research to innovations 
on the other, Morris et al. attempted to trace which 
research proceeded down a translation pathway 
to implementation in practice49. The authors faced 
significant challenges, both in undertaking that work of 
tracing, and in identifying clear methods that could be 
49 Morris ZS, Wooding, S & Grant, J (2011) The answer is 17 years, what is the question: Understanding time lags in translational research. 
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 104(12): 510–520.
50 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012) Emerging biotechnologies: Technology, choice and the public good, London: Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics.
51  Raman, S (2014) Responsive research: Putting the innovative back into agendas for innovation, Nottingham: University of Nottingham; 
McNie EC, Parris, A & Sarewitz, DR (2016) Improving the public value of science: A typology to inform discussion, design and 
implementation of research. Research Policy, 45(4): 884–895.
used to assess pathways to impact.  In the absence of 
such methods, funding was often delivered to projects 
on the basis of promises, founded on premises of 
linear translation processes that were not grounded 
in empirical research evidence. Similar promissory 
mechanisms have been described as intrinsic features 
of new and emerging fields. Conversely, bedside to 
bench / horizontal methods of intervention face not 
just the challenges encapsulated in the Collingridge 
Dilemma discussed earlier, but also face difficulties 
in achieving funding support from traditional sources 
which are seemingly more committed to funding basic 
research because of a belief in the alternative approach.
Such tensions are fundamental to address because 
assumed models concerning translation to applications 
are endemic within contemporary research funding 
policy where they are coupled to institutionalised reward 
structures in science and innovation (for instance in the 
form of intellectual property, a license to commercialise, 
professional promotion and the continuation of research 
funding)50. This means that global health projects 
appear to be caught within an external institutional 
tension that is difficult to contest. The implication is 
that this will remain a barrier to building responsive 
research systems; systems which are open to 
alternative models of funding, innovation (for instance 
grassroots innovation, appropriate technology and social 
innovation), purpose and conceptions of value beyond 
the economic. Yet it is precisely being open to these 
alternatives that the concept of responsible innovation 
demands51.
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Supplementary material
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Workshop programme
8:30-9:00  Arrival and registration
9:00-9:10 Welcome
Session 1: Introduction
9:10-9:35 Introduction to Global Health
 Prof. Bronwyn Parry, SSHM, KCL
9:35-10:00 Introduction to Synthetic Biology Biosensors
 Prof. Paul Freemont, CSynBI, Imperial College London
Case study 1: Arsenic Biosensor
10:00-10:30 Arsenic contamination: occurrence, causes, impacts and mitigation
 Peter Ravenscroft, independent consultant
10:30-11:00 Arsenic Biosensor Collaboration
 Lalitha Sundaram, Department of Pathology, University of Cambridge
11:00-11:30 Break
11:30-12:00 Risk assessment and regulatory issues
 Dr Simon Warne, Health and Safety Executive
12:00-13:00 Discussion of the arsenic biosensor case study
13:00-14:00 Lunch
Case study 2: Schistosome Biosensor
14:00-14:30 Schistosomiasis: occurrence, causes, impacts and mitigation
 Prof Joanne Webster, Centre for Emerging, Endemic and Exotic Diseases, Royal Veterinary College
14:30-15:00 Schistosome biosensor project
 Dr Alex Webb, CSynBI, Imperial College London
15:00-16:00 Discussion of the schistosome biosensor case study
16:00-16:30 Break
Broader discussion
16:30-17:50 Identification and discussion of Generic Issues
17:50-18:00 Wrap-up and close
18:00-20:00 Reception
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Feedback received
All of the feedback received was highly positive, and all those who supplied feedback particularly emphasised the 
way in which open discussion was cultivated. One wrote that there was “interesting input from a variety of sources 
with widely different backgrounds”. Those who suggested ways in which it could have been improved suggested 
that scientists from the developing countries discussed could also have been included, and that some way of 
keeping record of the points being made (to avoid later confusion) through perhaps the use of a whiteboard would 
have been helpful. 
Those who provided feedback all agreed that the workshop would have an effect on their future work. One 
participant wrote that they “will take into account the issues discussed when designing future projects of this nature, 
as well as in completion of existing projects”. 
Another wrote that it was a “well run day” with an “Excellent moderator”.
67
Procedure to exclude a GMM from the scope of Directive 2009/41/EC
The introduction to Part B of Annex II of Directive 2009/41/EC on contained use of genetically modified micro-
organisms (GMMs) states that:
Types of GMMs listed in Part C in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 20(2) 
are excluded from the scope of this Directive. GMMs will be added to the list on a case-by-case basis and exclusion 
will relate only to each clearly identified GMM. This exclusion applies only when the GMM is used under conditions of 
contained use as defined in point (c) of Article 2. It does not apply to the deliberate release of GMMs. For a GMM to be 
listed in Part C, it must be proved that it meets the criteria given below.
Article 20(2) of Directive 2009/41/EC states that:
Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5a(1) to (4) and Article 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply, having 
regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof.
Decision 1999/468/EC lays down,
“the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission”
Article 5 (1) to (4) and Article 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC set out the regulatory procedure for the use of the 
“regulatory committee” that delivers opinions on draft measures prior to Member States voting on whether or not to 
adopt draft measures.
Criteria establishing the safety of GMMs for human health and the environment (Directive 2009/41/EC, Annex II, 
Part B) (GMMs that do not meet these criteria may not be included in Part C):
2.1. Strain verification/authentication. Identity of the strain must be precisely established. Modification must be known and 
verified.
2.2. Documented and established evidence of safety. Documented evidence of the safety of the organism must be 
provided. 
2.3. Genetic stability. Where any instability could adversely affect safety, evidence of stability is required. 
3. Specific criteria 
3.1. Non-pathogenic. The GMM should not be capable of causing disease or harm to a healthy human, plant or animal. 
Since pathogenicity includes both toxigenicity and allergenicity, the GMM should therefore be: 
3.1.1. Non-toxigenic. The GMM should not produce increased toxigenicity as a result of the genetic modification nor be 
noted for its toxigenic properties.
3.1.2. Non-allergenic. The GMM should not produce increased allergenicity as a result of the genetic modification nor be 
a noted allergen, having, for example, allergenicity comparable in particular with that of the micro-organisms identified in 
Directive 2000/54/EC. 
3.2. No harmful adventitious agents. The GMM should not harbour known harmful adventitious agents such as other 
micro-organisms, active or latent, existing alongside or inside the GMM, that could cause harm to human health and the 
environment. 
3.3. Transfer of genetic material. The modified genetic material must not give rise to harm if transferred; nor should it be 
self-transmissible or transferable at a frequency greater than other genes of the recipient or parental micro-organism.
3.4. Safety for the environment in the event of a significant and unintended release. GMMs must not produce adverse 
effects on the environment, immediate or delayed, should any incident involving a significant and unintended release occur. 
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